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Abstract 
In 2003, women working part-time in the UK earned, on average, 22% less than women working full-time.  
Compared to women who work FT, PT women are more likely to have low levels of education, to be in a 
couple, to have young and numerous children, to work in small establishments in distribution, hotels and 
restaurants and in low-level occupations.  Taking account of these differences, the PT penalty for identical 
women doing the same job is estimated to be about 10% if one does not take account of differences in the 
occupations of FT and PT women and 3% if one does.  The occupational segregation of PT and FT women can 
explain most of the aggregate PT pay penalty.  In particular, women who move from FT to PT work are much 
more likely to change employer and/or occupation than those who maintain their hours status.  And, when 
making this transition, they tend to make a downward occupational move, evidence that many women working 
PT are not making full use of their skills and experience. 
 Women working PT in the other EU countries have similar problems to the UK but the UK has the 
highest PT pay penalty and one of the worst problems in enabling women to move between FT and PT work 
without occupational demotions.  At the same time, PT work in the UK carries a higher job satisfaction 
premium (or a lower job satisfaction penalty) than in most other countries.  Policy initiatives in recent years like 
the National Minimum Wage, the Part-Time Workers Regulations and the Right to Request Flexible Working 
appear to have had little impact on the PT pay penalty as yet although it is too early to make a definitive 
assessment of the full impact of some of these regulations.  The most effective way to reduce the PT pay penalty 
would be to strengthen rights for women to move between FT and PT work without losing their current job. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In 2003 45% of female workers in Britain were working part-time (PT) and the majority of 
British women will work part-time at some point in their lifetime.  Consequently, the types of 
jobs and the levels of pay and conditions that are available on a part-time basis are of crucial 
importance in influencing the economic opportunities of women.  But, although the overall 
pay gap between men and women in the UK has fallen in the last 30 years – Anderson et al, 
(2001) reported that the average hourly earnings of women rose from 64% of that of men in 
1973 to 82% in 2000 and the latest figures from the New Earnings Survey suggest little 
change over the period 2000-2003 – there is an important difference in the fortunes of full-
time (FT) and PT women over this period.  While the earnings of FT women have been rising 
relative to men’s this is not true of the earnings of PT women.  This implies that the earnings 
gap between FT and PT women has been widening. 
 
Figure 1.1 presents a measure of the gap in average hourly earnings between FT and PT 
women using data from the New Earnings Survey (NES) for the period 1975-2003 and from 
the Labour Force Survey (LFS) for 1993-2003.  The estimates from these two data sources do 
differ but they both suggest a very large pay gap between FT and PT women – the NES 
suggests that in 2001 the average hourly earnings among PT women were 26% below those 
of FT women – for the LFS, the gap is somewhat lower though still substantial at 22%.  This 
pay gap is what we call the part-time pay penalty (PTPP) and its cause is the subject of this 
report*.  Furthermore, the NES suggests that the PTPP has risen over time (the PTPP was 
15% in 1975) though most of the rise in the PTPP seems to have occurred prior to 1995 and 
the LFS data does not suggest any very marked trend over the last 10 years. 
 
In this report, we provide an analysis of the current level of the PT pay penalty in the UK, 
how it has changed over time and how the UK compares with other European countries.  The 
plan of the report is as follows.  In the next section we discuss the relative advantages and 
disadvantages of different definitions of part-time status.  The third section then compares the 
characteristics of FT and PT British women showing that there are large differences in their 
education, their age, the types of households they live in, the employers that they work for 
and the jobs that they do.   
 
The fourth section then presents estimates of the current level of the PTPP in the UK.  The 
main conclusion is that although the overall unadjusted PTPP is very large (as shown in 
Figure 1.1), this cannot be used a reliable estimate of the pay penalty that a given woman 
would suffer if she changed from FT to PT status because women working PT are very 
different from those working FT and the numbers in Figure 1.1 do not take account of these 
differences. If one does adjust the PTPP to take account of these differences then the PTPP is 
10% if one does not control for differences in occupation and 3% if one does.  That is, within 
occupations, the PTPP is very small.  The true PTPP probably lies between these two 
numbers.  The fifth section then considers trends in the UK PTPP showing that the change 
over the last 30 years visible in Figure 1.1 can mostly be ascribed to rising differences in the 
types of jobs done by FT and PT women and to the general rise in UK wage inequality†.   
 
                                                 
* It should be noted, although we do not analyse it, that there is also a large part-time pay penalty for men – the 
New Earnings Survey suggests that in 2003 part-time men had average hourly earnings that were 32% lower 
than the average hourly earnings of full-time men.   
† This affects the PTPP because rising wage inequality has led to a wider wage gap between managers and 
cleaners, a change that tends to raise the PTPP because most managers work FT and most cleaners work PT. 
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Because occupational segregation is so important in understanding the PTPP the sixth section 
tries to explain why it is that PT workers come to be over-represented in badly-paid jobs.  We 
present evidence that women who want to change their hours from FT to PT often have to 
change both employers and occupations to do so and that there is a tendency for the change to 
be associated with downward occupational mobility.  All of this contributes to an under-
utilization of the skills of women who work PT.   
 
The seventh section then compares the situation of PT women in the UK with other EU 
countries.  The most striking fact is that both the unadjusted and adjusted PTPPs in the UK 
are the highest in the EU.  In addition British women seem to find it harder than women in 
other European countries to change their hours status without suffering downward 
occupational mobility.  This paints a rather bleak picture of the situation of British women 
who are working PT.  But, there is a more positive side.  British PT women report levels of 
job satisfaction that are amongst the highest in Europe.  Finally the eighth section discusses 
policies that have been implemented or proposed in Britain with the aim of improving the 
conditions of PT workers and reducing the PTPP.  Very few of the recent initiatives seem to 
have had much impact, largely because they have not been very effective in reducing the 
occupational segregation of FT and PT women. 
 
The main conclusions of the report can be stated as follows: 
 
• In 2003 women working part-time in the UK earned, on average, 22% less than women 
working full-time – this is the part-time pay penalty. The part-time pay penalty has 
increased over the past 30 years with most of the rise occurring prior to the mid-1990s. 
• This average pay differential between part-time and full-time women cannot be used as 
an estimate of the pay penalty that would be suffered by a given woman moving from 
full-time to part-time work because women working part-time and women working full-
time are very different in their characteristics and do very different jobs. 
• Compared to women who work full-time, part-time women are more likely to have low 
levels of education, to be in a couple, to have dependent children that are both young and 
numerous, to work in small establishments in distribution, hotels and restaurants and in 
low-level occupations.  Almost 25% of part-time women are a shop assistant, a care 
assistant or a cleaner.  15.1% of full-time women are managers but only 4.4% of part-time 
women. 
• Taking account of these differences the part-time penalty for identical women doing the 
same job is estimated to be about 10% if one does not take account of differences in the 
occupations of FT and PT women and 3% if one does. 
• The pay differential between full-time and part-time women within occupation is very 
small and the occupational segregation of part-time and full-time women can explain 
most of the aggregate part-time pay penalty. 
• The aggregate part-time pay penalty has risen over time but almost all of this rise can be 
explained by a rising contribution of occupational segregation.  Women working part-
time have failed to match the occupational up-grades made by women who work full-
time.  
• Rising UK wage inequality has also acted to widen the pay gap between women working 
part-time and women working full-time as it has widened the pay gap between high-level 
and low-level occupations. 
• Women who move from full-time to part-time work are much more likely to change 
employer and/or occupation when making this transition than are women who maintain 
their hours status. 
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• Women moving from full-time to part-time work, on average, make a downward 
occupational move, evidence that many women working part-time are not making full use 
of their skills and experience.  This downward occupational mobility is less marked for 
those women who move from full-time to part-time work without changing their 
employer.  
• There is also evidence of under-utilisations of the skills of women working part-time 
among women with nursing and teaching qualifications. 
• More research is needed on whether there are good reasons for why employers do not 
make certain jobs available on a part-time basis or whether some combination of inertia, 
lack of imagination and prejudice is also involved.  
• Women working part-time in the other EU countries have similar problems to the UK but 
the UK has the highest part-time pay penalty and one of the worst problems in enabling 
women to move between full-time and part-time work without occupational demotions. 
At the same time, part-time work in the UK carries a higher job satisfaction premium (or 
a lower job satisfaction penalty) than in most other countries. 
• Policy initiatives in recent years like the National Minimum Wage (1999), the Part-Time 
Workers Regulations (2000) and the Right to Request Flexible Working (2003) appear to 
have had little impact on the part-time pay penalty as yet although it is too early to make a 
definitive assessment of the full impact of some of these regulations. 
• The most effective way to reduce the part-time pay penalty would be to strengthen rights 
for women to move between full-time and part-time work without losing their current job. 
 
 
2. Defining FT/PT Status 
 
There are two main types of definition of PT status.  The first is based on self-assessment i.e. 
the answer to a direct question about whether the individual is full-time or part-time - for 
example, the UK LFS asks the question “in your main job were you working full-time or 
part-time?” 
 
Alternatively one can use a definition of PT status based on hours worked: by convention the 
hours measure used is the basic usual weekly hours in a job.  In the UK the standard 
definition is that part-time workers have usual basic weekly hours less than or equal to 30 
(with a cut–off of 25 for teachers as their hours reflect only classroom hours and not 
preparation/marking time) but, for example, a cut-off of 35 hours is more common in the 
United States (see, for example, Blank, 1990).  Alternatives would be actual hours worked in 
the job or to assign workers to PT or FT status based on total hours worked in all jobs.  This 
last point is quite important as 7.6% of women who are PT in their main job have a second 
job compared to only 3.2% of women who are FT in their main job (figures from 2003 LFS).  
Women with more than one paid job will mostly be PT in all of them so that some “part-
time” workers may end up working as many hours in total as some full-timers.  But, as any 
disadvantage suffered by part-time workers is likely to occur within a particular job and not 
be influenced greatly by hours worked in other jobs, it seems most sensible to determine part-
time status on a job-by-job basis rather than a worker-by-worker basis. 
 
Where a data set only contains information that can be used for one type of definition of PT 
status or the other, a researcher can only use the definition of part-time status that is available.  
But, where there is a choice, which measure is preferable?  The answer is that they both have 
advantages and disadvantages. 
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The main disadvantage of the self-assessment measure is that it is subjective – it is 
conceivable that someone working ‘only’ 60 hours per week in a firm where the culture is to 
work 70 hours perceives themselves as part-time though outsiders might not agree.  On the 
other hand this subjectivity may be an advantage in some circumstances.  One of the major 
concerns about the PT pay penalty is that those working part-time are at a disadvantage 
relative to those in the same job who are working full-time – in this case self-assessment may 
be the best definition to use.  And this ‘subjectivity’ is also to be found in legislation‡.  For 
example, the 2000 Part-Time Workers’ Regulations has the following definition “a worker is 
a part-time worker for the purpose of these Regulations if he is paid wholly or in part by 
reference to the time he works and, having regard to the custom and practice of the employer 
in relation to workers employed by the worker's employer under the same type of contract, is 
not identifiable as a full-time worker”.  And international statistics on the incidence of PT 
work produced by agencies like Eurostat use a self-assessment measure giving the reason that 
“it is impossible to establish a more exact distinction between part-time and full-time work, 
due to variation in working hours between Member states and also between branches of 
industry”.  The advantage of the hours-based definition is that it is ‘objective’, one can 
distinguish between degrees of part-time work, but it is inflexible.  One typically has to make 
some allowance for teachers and it may be inappropriate for some other jobs. 
 
One should consider whether it makes much of a difference what definition is used.  Table 
2.1 presents a cross-tabulation from the LFS in 2003 of how many workers are classified as 
PT or FT according to the self-assessment and the hours-based definitions.  The hours-based 
measure has 45.9% of women working PT compared to 43.5% on the self-assessment 
measure and 5.2% of women have a different classification depending on the definition used.  
So, although there are differences, they are not very substantial.  
 
Figure 2.1 shows the relationship between the basic usual hours worked and the self-assessed 
measure of part-time status.  It plots the fraction of women who report themselves as PT for 
each level of basic usual hours.  All of those with basic usual hours below 15 report 
themselves as PT (these are not shown on the Figure) and all those with basic usual hours 
above 40 report themselves as FT.  But, in the middle one can see that some women who 
work the same basic usual hours report they are PT and some report they are FT.  However, 
around 30 hours there is a rapid fall in the proportion reporting they are PT so the convention 
of the 30-hours threshold for defining PT status does seem to reflect perceptions.  For 
teachers the fall in the proportion reporting they are PT occurs around 25 hours so the 
tradition of using a different hours threshold for teachers also seems justified.   
 
In some of the literature on PT work a distinction is made between ‘short’ PT jobs and ‘long’ 
PT jobs (see, for example, Tam, 1997).  The average basic usual weekly hours for women 
who define themselves as PT is 19 hours compared to 38 hours for those women defining 
themselves as FT.  Approximately half of PT women work less than 20 hours per week and 
one-quarter work less than 15 hours per week.  The gap in weekly hours of work is the result 
both of PT women working, on average, fewer hours per day and fewer days per week.  But 
the latter effect is more important – 85% of FT women work 5 days a week compared to only 
35% of PT women (all figures from the 2003 LFS).  
 
                                                 
‡ Not all legislation has the same definition.  For example maternity rights used to differ according to whether 
individuals worked more or less than 16 hours per week. 
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In this report the vast bulk of our analysis is based on the self-assessment definition of PT 
status.  But, at a number of crucial points we do check whether any of our substantive 
conclusions are affected by this choice and the answer is that the choice of definition does not 
seem to make a large difference to the results.  
 
 
3. What Types of Women Work Part-Time? 
 
The main reasons given by British women for working PT are reported in Table 3.1.  Over 
80% of PT women report they do not want a FT job and the next most common answer (11% 
of respondents) is that the woman is a student.    Students are an increasing fraction of PT 
workers as more young people stay longer in education and changes in the funding of 
education mean that more have to earn some money to finance their studies.  But there is less 
concern about students with low earnings because this is not a permanent state of affairs and 
many of them will go on to have much higher earnings later in life.  For this reason, the 
analysis that follows excludes, wherever possible, women who are in full-time education.  
 
The second column of Table 3.1 presents the reasons given by non-students for taking a PT 
job – now almost 90% of respondents report that they did not want a FT job.  The LFS then 
asks these women why they do not want a FT job – their answers are tabulated in Table 3.2.  
68% of women give domestic or family commitments as the reason they do not want or are 
prevented from taking a FT job.  So PT work seems to be an option taken by women when 
there are heavy competing demands on their time.  The fact that most PT women report they 
do not want a FT job should not be taken as evidence that the PT pay penalty is no cause for 
concern – these women may be choosing PT work as the best option available to them in the 
labour market but the available choices may be limited by forces over which individual 
women have no control.   
 
The characteristics of PT and FT women differ in many ways, the most important of which 
are: 
- age 
- education 
- household structure  
- ethnicity 
- types of employer 
- types of contract 
- occupation 
 
Part-Time Working, Age and Education 
 
The incidence of PT work varies with age and with education as shown by Figure 3.1 (this 
figure excludes students).  For all age groups more educated women are less likely to be 
working PT.  There are a number of possible explanations for this.  As the more-educated 
typically have greater earnings potential, the loss in earnings from reducing hours worked is 
larger making PT work seem less attractive and the higher earnings may also increase the 
ability to pay for childcare making it easier to work FT.  Or it may be that better-educated 
women are, on average, more career-oriented and PT work is seen (probably correctly given 
the evidence presented later in this report) as having an adverse impact on career prospects. 
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For all education groups, the proportion of women working PT has a similar lifetime profile 
though with some differences in timing.  The PT proportion rises after labour market entry 
(rather later for better-educated women) peaking in the late 30s then falling slightly until the 
age of 50 and then rising again after the age of 60.  The obvious explanation for this pattern is 
the constraint imposed by domestic commitments: women are much more likely to work part-
time if they have children or other domestic commitments with the rise in the incidence of PT 
work occurring at later ages for better-educated women as, on average, these women are 
older when they have children.    
 
Part-Time Working, Age and Household Characteristics 
 
Figure 3.2 presents the lifetime profile for PT working for women in 4 different household 
structures – single and coupled, with and without dependent children.  One notices a very 
large impact of dependent children – 60% of coupled women aged 30-40 with dependent 
children work PT compared to 10% for childless women.  The impact of being in a couple is 
much smaller – lone mothers are less likely to work PT than other mothers especially when 
they are young (though it should be noted that the UK has a rather low –though rising - 
employment rate among lone parents – see Gregg and Harkness, 2003, for recent trends in the 
UK and international comparisons) but for older women in households without dependent 
children, coupled women are more likely to work part-time than single women.  This last 
finding might be a generational effect with older married women being less committed to the 
labour market or it may be a continuation of PT work even after dependent children have left 
home that occurs because of habit or because years of PT work limit the quality of FT jobs 
available to them in a way that makes PT work continue to be the most attractive option. 
 
Not surprisingly, it is not just the presence of children but their age that affects the likelihood 
of working part-time – Figure 3.3 plots the percentage working part-time against age of 
youngest child.  Apart from single mothers with children aged less than a year, the older the 
youngest child the less likely is the woman to work part-time.  For single mothers, the 
percentage working PT seems to fall markedly after the age of 5 while for coupled mothers 
there seems to be a more gradual decline.  And the number of children is also important – 
women with 2 dependent children are 15 percentage points more likely to work PT. 
 
Part-Time Working and Ethnicity 
 
Table 3.3 reports the variation in the incidence of PT work across ethnic groups.  The 
incidence of PT working is highest among white women (at 42%) and lowest among women 
in the black ethnic groups (around 25%) with the Asian groups in between with an incidence 
of around 30% (although Pakistani women have an incidence of 40%).  It is important to 
remember that the employment rates of women vary across ethnic groups in the UK – the 
second column of Table 3.3 shows that employment rates are highest for white women, 
slightly lower for Indian, Black Caribbean and Chinese women and much lower for Pakistani 
and Bangladeshi women.  The third column shows that almost 94% of working women in the 
UK are white: one consequence of this is that we have rather small samples of ethnic 
minority women in the data sets available to us and this prevents a detailed study of the PTPP 
among ethnic minorities. 
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Part-Time Working and Employer Characteristics 
 
Part-time women are less likely to work in large workplaces with 55% of PT women working 
in establishments with more than 25 employees compared to 70% of FT women.  They are 
equally likely to work in private and public sectors.  There are very large differences in the 
industrial distribution of PT and FT women.  Table 3.4 shows that PT women are less likely 
to work in manufacturing and financial services than FT women and much more likely to be 
working in distribution, hotels and restaurants. 
 
Part-Time Working and Job Characteristics 
 
On average PT women have been in their jobs for 6.4 years compared to 7.3 years for FT 
women.  PT women are less likely to be in a permanent job with 7.4% of PT women being in 
some type of non-permanent job compared to 4.7% of FT women.  45% of these non-
permanent jobs for PT women are for a fixed period or a fixed task, 22% are casual work and 
only 12% are agency temping.  Table 3.5 documents the incidence of various flexible 
working practices among PT and FT working women.  The incidence of flex-time is lower 
among PT than FT workers but term-time working agreements and job-sharing are more 
common.  However, with the exception of term-time working agreements which almost 10% 
of PT women have, the incidence of all these arrangements is low.  This conclusion is not 
consistent with other research findings, notably those from the second Work-Life Balance 
Study (WLBS) conducted in early 2003 (Stevens et al, 2004), that report a much higher 
incidence of flexible working practices.  In part this may be because the WLBS question asks 
about the use of the practice not just currently (as the LFS question does) but with the current 
employer over the past year.  But the differences seem too large to be explained by this fact 
alone – for example, WLBS reports almost 9% of women are job-sharing compared to 1.5% 
according to the LFS.        
 
Part-Time Working and Occupation 
 
One of the most striking differences between PT and FT workers is in the types of jobs that 
they do.  Table 3.6 presents the distribution of occupation across the 9 broad categories of the 
2000 Standard Occupational Classification for both PT and FT women.  The most striking 
fact is that PT women are much less likely than FT women to be working as managers, 
professionals and associate professional and much more likely to be in personal service, sales 
and elementary occupations.  For example 15.1% of FT women are managers compared to 
only 4.4% of PT women and 17.9% of PT women are in the elementary occupations 
compared to only 5.4% of FT women.  This deficit of PT workers in the higher-level 
occupations and surplus in the lower-level occupations is (as later sections of this report 
demonstrate) very important for understanding the PT pay penalty so let us consider the 
occupational distribution of PT and FT women in more detail.     
 
The occupational segregation of PT and FT women becomes even more marked when one 
looks at detailed occupations.  The 2000 Standard Occupational Classification has 
approximately 370 occupations in its most detailed classification and Table 3.7 lists all the 
detailed occupations that account for more than 1% of employment either among PT women 
or FT women together with their average hourly wage (this is computed across all women, 
both PT and FT – see Table 4.5 below for pay differentials between FT and PT women within 
occupations).  10% of PT women are sales assistants with a further 7% as cleaners and 5% as 
care assistants – in total almost 1 in 4 PT women are in just these 3 occupations all of which 
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are low-paid.  Although many of the important occupations for PT women are low-paid there 
are some that are better-paid – for example, 3.4% of PT women are working as nurses.  The 
most common occupations among FT women have many of the same low-paid occupations 
though with smaller fractions of employment than among PT women but some better-paid 
occupations like nurses, teachers, some managers and administrative officers in government 
also appear in the list of important occupations for FT women. 
 
Another way of looking at the same issue is to consider the occupations that have the highest 
and lowest proportions of PT workers.  Table 3.8 lists the 10 occupations that most and least 
PT intensive together with the average hourly wage in those occupations.  Only 1 of the 10 
most PT intensive occupations has an average hourly wage above the median wage for all 
women and 7 out of the 10 have average hourly wages in the bottom quartile of female 
hourly earnings.  In contrast 7 out of the 10 least PT intensive occupations have average 
earnings above the median for all women and even those with average earnings below the 
median are only slightly below.   
 
Conclusion 
 
This section has suggested that women working PT are more likely than FT women to be 
less-educated, older, white, in a couple with dependent children who are both numerous and 
young, to be working in small establishments in shops, hotels and restaurants, in a temporary 
job, with low job tenure and in low-level occupations.  In the interests of clarity of exposition 
we have documented all of this using bivariate comparisons.  In doing this there is a danger 
that the apparent effect of one characteristic is really the effect of some other that is excluded 
from the specific comparison being made.  But a multivariate analysis that includes all the 
variables simultaneously in a statistical model of the determinants of part-time working leads 
to similar conclusions.  Appendix A provides this detailed analysis for those who are 
interested.    
 
 
4. The Current Level of the Part-Time Pay Penalty 
 
Which Pay Penalty? 
 
In investigating the economic situation of women working PT one needs a comparison group 
against which to benchmark the performance of PT women.  The two most commonly used 
comparison groups are full-time men and full-time women.  The pay gaps between PT 
women and the two possible comparison groups are related to each other as can be seen in the 
expression: 
 , , ,
, , ,
.F PT F PT F FT
M FT F FT M FT
W W W
W W W
=  
where ,F PTW  is the average level of pay among female part-time workers etc.  This formula 
shows that the pay gap between part-time women and full-time men can be thought of as the 
pay gap between part-time women and full-time women multiplied by the pay gap between 
full-time women and full-time men.  In this report we focus solely on the pay gap between 
part-time and full-time women as the formula makes clear that a discussion of the pay gap 
between part-time women and full-time men also makes it necessary to discuss the factors 
responsible for the pay gap between full-time women and men, an issue that has been 
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considered extensively elsewhere (see, for example, Anderson et al., 2001) and would result 
in a much larger enquiry.   
 
But it is important to recognise that there are dangers in this.  If, for example, we find that the 
PTPP has widened this could either be because the position of PT women has worsened or 
the position of FT women has improved or the position of FT women has improved faster 
than the position of PT women.  It is necessary to have a clear idea about this as one might 
have a very different attitude towards policies that reduce the PTPP by improving the 
opportunities available to PT women or policies that reduce the PTPP by reducing the 
opportunities available to FT women.  
 
Existing Studies 
 
There is a small existing literature on the pay differential between FT and PT women.  The 
earliest studies were for the US (e.g. Jones and Long, 1979; Blank, 1990) but there are also 
some studies for the UK.  The first was probably Ermisch and Wright (1993) who used data 
from the 1980 Women and Employment Survey.  In their data the average hourly earnings 
among PT women were approximately 85% of the average hourly earnings of FT women but 
much of this gap could be ‘explained’ by differences in education and work experience with 
an ‘unexplained’ PTPP in the region of 2-8%.  Harkness (2002, ch3) is the most thorough 
study for the UK – she uses data from the 1980 Women and Employment Survey, the British 
Household Panel Survey and the General Household Survey.   She documents the rise in the 
PTPP from 1980 to 1998 and finds that much of this can be accounted for by changes in the 
characteristics of FT and PT women.  
 
Measuring the Part-Time Pay Penalty: Conceptual Issues 
 
We start our analysis by a consideration of the current level of the PTPP.  As shown in Figure 
1.1 the raw gap in hourly pay between PT and FT women is large – PT women, on average 
earn 22% less than FT women according to the latest figures for 2003 from the LFS.  But, it 
is not clear that this is a good measure of the pay penalty that would be suffered by an 
individual woman if she decided to switch from FT to PT status which is what we would like 
to be able to measure.  For example, we have already noted that FT women are, on average, 
better-educated than PT women so that part of the overall PT pay penalty can be accounted 
for by this education differential.  As a switch from FT to PT status cannot be expected to be 
associated with a change in education we need to ‘adjust’ the overall pay penalty for this 
difference in education between FT and PT women.  Similar considerations apply to other 
differences in characteristics between FT and PT women noted in the previous section. 
 
However, the characteristics that should be controlled for in getting an estimate of the pay 
penalty that would be suffered by a woman who switches from FT to PT work is not entirely 
clear-cut.  A particularly pertinent example is ‘occupation’.  If a woman changes from FT to 
PT status a change in occupation may be necessary (we present evidence on this in Section 
6).  If this is the case then an estimate of the PTPP that controls for occupation will not be 
capturing an important aspect of the PTPP and will only, at best, provide an estimate of the 
PTPP if a woman switches from FT to PT status without having to change occupation 
something that is perhaps over-optimistic.  At the same time an estimate of the PTPP that 
does not control for differences in occupation may exaggerate the true PTPP as part of the 
reason that FT and PT women work in different occupations is the differences in labour 
market experience they possess.  We deal with this problem by presenting estimates of the 
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PTPP that both include and exclude occupation – it seems likely that the true PTPP lies 
somewhere between these two estimates.  
 
 Economists have developed a variety of techniques to adjust the raw pay differentials for 
differences in characteristics and we present several of them to investigate the robustness of 
our estimates of the PTPP.  As they all give very similar answers, it does not seem to matter 
very much which is used.  A much more extensive discussion of these different 
methodologies, our application of them and more detailed results is contained in Appendix B.   
 
Measures of the Current Level of the Part-Time Pay Penalty from the LFS 
 
Table 4.1 presents our estimates of the PTPP using data from the Labour Force Survey for 
2001-2003§.  Our sample is women aged 16-64 inclusive who are not in full-time education.  
We exclude those whose reported hourly wages are below £1 per hour or above £100 per 
hour.  The first row headed ‘Unadjusted PTPP’ shows that the average hourly earnings of PT 
women are 22.1% less than the average hourly earnings of FT women.  But, as explained 
above this cannot be used as an estimate of the PTPP that would be suffered by a woman 
moving from FT to PT work because it does not control for differences in the characteristics 
of PT and FT women.  The rest of the estimates in Table 4.1 do this though in different ways.  
The second row presents an estimate that is based on assuming that the PTPP is the same for 
everybody but that controls for year, month, region, education, age, ethnicity, marital status, 
the number of children, the age of youngest child, job tenure, employer size and industry and, 
in the final two columns, occupation– we label this the Adjusted PTPP (Constant)**.  The first 
column in the second row shows that when one controls for differences in characteristics 
between FT and PT women the PTPP falls from 22% to 11%.  This halving of the PTPP 
occurs because PT women are less well-educated, they work in lower wage industries, they 
work in smaller workplaces and they are less likely to work in London (on the other hand, 
they are older which is associated with higher earnings).  Although smaller than the 
unadjusted PTPP, this estimate is still quite large. 
 
But, as the next two columns show the inclusion of occupation as additional controls makes a 
very large difference.  In the second column we include the 9 broad occupational categories 
(that are listed in Table 3.6) and in the third column we include controls for the 370 detailed 
occupations in the SOC 2000 classification.  Inclusion of the broad occupational categories 
causes the adjusted PTPP to fall to 3.3% and the inclusion of the narrow occupational 
categories causes it to fall to 2.5%.  It is perhaps remarkable how much explanatory power is 
obtained just through the use of the 9 broad occupational categories.  Although these 
estimates of the PTPP are significantly different from zero in a statistical sense they are rather 
small in absolute terms.  The way to interpret this result is that, within occupations, the pay 
gap between PT and FT women is small.  This is in line with evidence from other surveys 
e.g. Stevens et al (2004) finds that 74% of women say that their employer provides PT 
workers with the same hourly rate of pay.   
 
                                                 
§  The start of the period is determined by the start of the use of the SOC2000 occupational classification and the 
end by the latest available data. 
** For the more technically minded this simply involves estimating a linear regression with the log of hourly 
earnings as the dependent variable, the other controls on the right-hand side and a dummy variable for whether 
the woman works PT.  The coefficient on this dummy variable is then converted from log to percentage points.  
More details can be found in Appendix B. 
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We have shown that occupational segregation of PT women into low-paid occupations can 
explain a very large part of the unadjusted PTPP††.  The difficult question to answer (and one 
that we try to address in the sixth section of this report) is whether we see few women 
working PT in high-wage occupations because the women who are qualified to work in those 
occupations all choose to work FT or because these well-paid jobs are not available on a PT 
basis (and, if this is the case, whether there is a good reason for this practice). 
 
The estimates in the second row of Table 4.1 assume that there is no variation in the PTPP 
something that is not necessarily the case. The final two rows of Table 4.1 present estimates 
of the PTPP that allow it to vary with the characteristics of the woman‡‡.   Once we allow the 
PTPP to vary with the characteristics of the worker there is too much information in total to 
be digestible so it is conventional to summarize the results by an estimate of the PTPP for a 
‘representative’ workers.  By convention these are the average PT worker and for the average 
FT worker and we report results for these in the last two rows of Table 4.1§§.  As can be seen 
the results are very similar both to each other and to the estimates based on the assumption 
that the PTPP is constant. 
 
There are other important statistical issues surrounding the estimates presented in Table 4.1.  
For example, the statistical models used assume that the characteristics affect the average log 
hourly earnings in a linear way and this may not be the case.  And the estimates assume that 
the decision to work FT or PT is independent of factors that are not controlled for in the 
determination of hourly earnings (i.e. is exogenous).  Appendix B contains more discussion 
of these issues but our conclusion is that the estimates presented in Table 4.1 give the correct 
impression about the magnitude and source of the PTPP. 
 
One other interesting question is the importance of different characteristics in accounting for 
the observed PTPP.  Table 4.2 presents estimates using the approach where we allow the 
PTPP to vary by characteristics.  In this approach one can evaluate the contribution of 
characteristics using either the returns to those characteristics for FT workers or PT workers.  
We report both in Table 4.2.  The first row reports the unadjusted PTPP of 22.1%.  The 
second row shows that differences in the characteristics of FT and PT workers (including 
occupation) can account for a gap of approximately 20%.  By far the most important 
characteristic is occupation – this variable alone is responsible for approximately 70% of the 
accounted-for part of the PTPP.  Education is the next most important followed by industry, 
employer size and region.  Age works in the opposite direction: as PT workers are, on 
average, older than FT workers this factor tends to reduce the unadjusted PTPP. 
 
Measures of the Part-Time Pay Penalty from the Workplace Employee Relations Survey 
 
Although the LFS is a very valuable source of information on earnings and the characteristics 
of workers, information on employers is relatively sparse.  For example, we do not have 
information on whether the jobs done by PT women have high levels of gender segregation 
                                                 
†† It is worth noting that attempts to account for the pay gap between men and women are never as ‘successful’ 
as these results are in accounting for the PTPP.  For example, the study of the UK gender pay gap by Anderson 
et al (2001) never managed to account for more than half of the unadjusted gap. 
‡‡ For the more technically minded these estimates are based on estimating separate linear regressions for log 
hourly earnings for PT and FT workers and then applying Oaxaca decompositions.  More details can be found in 
Appendix B. 
§§ It is conventional to report these estimates for two ‘representative’ women as a crude check on whether 
conclusions are sensitive to the choice of the representative woman. 
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or are done primarily by FT and PT workers in the particular establishment where they work.  
This is potentially important because studies of the gender pay gap (e.g. Anderson et al, 
2001) typically find that gender segregation is important. 
 
To see whether these variables are important for the PTPP we turn to an analysis of the  1998 
Workplace Employee Relations Survey (WERS), a survey of approximately 2000 
establishments (with more than 10 workers) and approximately 25000 workers within them.  
Information is collected on the personal characteristics of the workers and on the 
characteristics of the workplace. 
 
The unadjusted PTPP in the WERS data is 24.5%, slightly higher than in the LFS.  Inclusion 
of controls that exclude occupation reduce this to about 12%, again similar to the LFS (this is 
the first column of the second row).  The percentage of women in the job makes very little 
difference here suggesting that the crowding of women into certain jobs does not have much 
effect on the PTPP.   Inclusion of broad occupation controls also has a very large effect in 
this data set reducing the adjusted PTPP to 3.4%, again similar to the LFS.  One simple way 
to investigate the importance of firm characteristics is to look at the PTPP within firms 
(technically, this is what is called a fixed effect estimate).  When controls for the specific firm 
are included the estimate of the PTPP falls further to 2.5% (this is the third column).  This 
suggests that firm characteristics have a modest influence on the PTPP compared to the 
occupation done by women.      
 
Taken together, the fact that the estimates in Table 4.3 are broadly similar to those derived 
from the LFS suggests that the lack of availability of certain types of information on 
workplace characteristics in the LFS is not a serious impediment to getting good estimates of 
the PTPP from the LFS. 
  
Variation in the Part-Time Pay Penalty 
 
Some of the estimates of the PTPP reported in Table 4.1 allow the PTPP to vary with 
characteristics but the practice of reporting an estimate for a representative worker obscures 
the fact that the variation in the PTPP is itself of some interest.  One can see evidence of 
variation in the PTPP by comparing the contribution of different factors in Table 4.2 using 
the PT or FT coefficients.  Using PT coefficients the contribution of education is a little 
smaller and the contribution of experience much smaller.  This points to the fact that the 
returns to experience seem much lower for part-time women and that the returns to education 
are a little bit lower.  The explanation for this is probably that part-time work carries little 
value in the labour market – a conclusion that is in line with other studies (see, for example, 
Dolton, Joshi and Makepeace, 20003). 
 
Table 4.4 investigates in more detail variation in the PTPP by education.  The first row 
presents estimates of the unadjusted PTPP for 4 different education groups.  The unadjusted 
PTPP is larger for the less-educated being 17% for those with no educational qualifications 
and 13% for graduates.  However, once one controls for other characteristics, the adjusted 
estimates of the PTPP seem larger for the highly-educated.  For example, the adjusted 
(constant) PTPP once one includes education is 2.1% for those with no educational 
qualifications and 3.6% for graduates.  However, these differences are quite small.     
 
Table 4.5 investigates differences across different occupation groups estimating the PTPP in 
a selection of very specific occupations in which there are large numbers of both FT and PT 
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women.  We report both the unadjusted PTPP and the adjusted PTPP assuming they are 
constant.  In 5 of the 17 occupations reported in Table 4.5 there is a part-time pay premium 
and not a pay penalty although, once one includes controls a pay premium remains in only 3 
of the 17 occupations and is only significantly different from zero in one of them (nursing 
auxiliaries and assistants***).  Among the other occupations the largest adjusted part-time pay 
penalty is 5.3% among local government clerical assistants.  The overriding impression from 
Table 4.5 is that, within occupations, the adjusted PTPP is small. 
 
We also investigated whether there was any difference in the PTPP between public and 
private sectors.  The differences were very small. 
 
The Distribution of the Part-Time Pay Penalty 
 
Attention so far has focused solely on the difference in average earnings between PT and FT 
women.  But, the PT pay penalty might vary across the pay distribution.  Harkness (2002) 
found that it was smaller at the ends of the pay distribution and largest in the middle.  To 
investigate this Table 4.6 presents estimates of the PTPP at different points in the distribution.  
In line with the earlier conclusions of Harkness, the PTPP does seem to be larger in the 
middle of the distribution than at the extremes.  However, after controlling for characteristics 
(including occupation) these differentials are all relatively small peaking at about 10% at the 
25th percentile.   
 
Alternative definitions of PT status. 
 
All the estimates so far have been based on the self-assessment measure of PT status.  We 
also provided some estimate using an hours-based measure.  The comparison of the two is 
presented in Table 4.7.  It does not appear to make much difference which measure is used. 
 
We also explored whether there was a significant difference in the PTPP between women 
who are in ‘long’ PT jobs (working more than 16 hours a week) and ‘short’ PT jobs.  We 
found no significant differences and we have not pursued this angle further. 
  
Conclusion 
 
The unadjusted PTPP is very large with the average PT woman having hourly wages that are 
22% below those of the average FT woman.  But, because the average PT worker and FT 
worker are so different this unadjusted figure cannot be used as an estimate of the pay penalty 
that would be suffered by a woman switching from FT to PT work.  An adjusted estimate of 
the PTPP that does not control for occupation is about 11%.  However this falls to 3.5% if 
occupation is controlled for.  How one should interpret this importance of occupation is of 
vital importance.  The fact that within occupations the gap in earnings between FT and PT 
workers is small suggests that women will not suffer a sizeable wage penalty if they can 
maintain their occupation while transferring from FT to PT status.  But that is a big ‘if’: the 
evidence presented later in this report suggests that many women do not maintain their 
current occupation while changing their working hours and are forced to make a downward 
occupational move if they want to move from FT to PT work.  
 
                                                 
*** This may be the result of the fact that many PT workers in this occupation are agency workers who are 
remunerated at a higher hourly rate than regular workers and should probably not be taken as a ‘model’ 
occupation for avoiding the PTPP.  
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5. Trends in the Part-Time Pay Penalty 
 
Trends in PT Working 
 
Figure 5.1 shows that there has been very little change in the proportion of women working 
PT in the past 20 years, during which the percentage has varied between 41% and 43% (see 
Rice, 1993, for earlier trends in part-time working). But, this picture of stability is somewhat 
misleading as more women are working now than 20 years ago so that a higher percentage of 
all women of working age are working PT than previously as well as a higher percentage 
working FT.  Figure 5.2 presents the evolution of the fraction of all women who are working 
FT and the fraction working PT.  It is quite likely that some women who previously worked 
PT are now working FT and some women who previously did not work for wages at all are 
now working PT.   
 
Trends in the Part-Time Pay Penalty since the Early 1990s 
 
Our earlier analysis primarily used data from the LFS for the period since 2001.  To assess 
whether there have been any changes over time, we present estimates of the PTPP in the LFS 
using earlier data.  As earnings data only started in the LFS in 1993 we cannot go back very 
far.  Table 5.1 presents a comparison of the PTPP in the period 1993-1995 with that from 
2001-2003 (these estimates are the same as those in Table 4.2 but are repeated for 
convenience).  The unadjusted PTPP is 22.4% in 1993/5 and 22.1% in 2001/3.  The adjusted 
PTPPs are also very similar in the two periods suggesting little change in the PTPP in the last 
10 years.  The fact that, within occupations, the PTPP was very small in the early 1990s, 
suggests that the Part-Time Workers Regulations that came into force in 2000 and ensured 
that PT workers could not be paid a lower hourly rate than FT workers doing the same job 
had little impact because this was already largely the case. 
 
The bottom part of Table 5.1 shows the relative importance of different variables in 
accounting for the gap between the unadjusted and adjusted PTPP in the two periods.  There 
is more change here: occupation and industry seem more important than in the past and 
education and employer size less important.  But some caution is needed here: there is a 
change in the system of occupational classification with the introduction of SOC2000 that 
was so substantial that one cannot directly compare estimates in the two periods. 
 
This conclusion of stability in the PTPP over the last 10 years is broadly in line with the 
evolution of the PT pay penalty as presented in Figure 1.1.  But that picture also showed that, 
prior to the 1990s there was a big rise in the PT pay penalty that needs to be explained. 
 
Longer-Run Trends in the Part-Time Pay Penalty 
 
To analyse earlier trends the absence of earnings data in the LFS forces us to use another 
dataset – here we use the New Earnings Survey (NES).  Measures of PT status are inevitably 
different in the LFS and NES.  With the NES one has to use an hours-based definition of PT 
status as there is no self-assessment question and one cannot exclude students though the 
earnings of many students are probably fall below the National Insurance threshold and, 
hence, they do not appear in the sample. In addition the NES is known to under-sample those 
with very low earnings, most of whom will be PT.  And many of the worker characteristics 
that are available in the LFS are not available in the NES – in the analysis that follows we use 
only age, industry and occupation.  There do seem to be differences in the estimates of the 
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levels of the PTPP in the LFS and NES (only some of which can be explained by the different 
definitions of PT status) with the unadjusted estimate for the NES being rather higher than for 
the LFS (one can see this in Figure 1.1).  But, in spite of these difficulties it seems likely that 
the NES gives an accurate picture of trends in the PTPP. 
 
The overall trend in the PTPP for the NES has been presented in Figure 1.1.  This shows a 
dramatic growth from 14% in 1975 to 28% in 1995 after which there is not much of a 
noticeable trend.  Given that we have already shown that, for LFS data, one can explain a 
large part of the pay penalty using various characteristics, notably occupation, one might 
wonder whether this is true over time.  Figure 5.3 plots the unadjusted PTPP and the adjusted 
PTPP once one controls for age, industry and occupation.  What is most striking is that the 
adjusted PTPP shows very little change over time being around 10% throughout the period 
1975-2001.  This estimate of the adjusted PTPP is larger than that found in the LFS, a result 
that can partly be explained by the fact that some important variables (education, employer 
size and household characteristics) are not present in the NES but would also seem to be 
partly the result of the fact (reported earlier) that the estimated PTPP does seem larger in the 
NES than the LFS even when comparable definitions of PT status and the same control 
variables are used.   
 
The Changing Contributions of Age, Industry and Occupation 
 
The implication of Figure 5.3 is that a growing part of the unadjusted PTPP can be accounted 
for by differences in age, industry and occupation between FT and PT women.  The natural 
next question to ask is which of these variables are the most important.  The answer is 
contained in Figure 5.4 – here we decompose the accounted-for part of the unadjusted PT pay 
penalty into the separate components due to differences in age, industry and occupation 
(using the coefficients from the FT wage equation).  As was the conclusion for the analysis of 
the current pay penalty, occupation is far and away the most important of these three 
variables.  Furthermore, the contribution of occupation has been rising over time – in 1975 
occupation could account for 10 percentage points of the unadjusted pay penalty but by 2001 
this had risen to almost 20 percentage points.  Changes in the age distribution of FT and PT 
workers also contribute 5 percentage points to the rise though this effect is much smaller if 
one uses the PT coefficients (because, as noted in the previous section, the return to 
experience is lower for PT women).  Industry is and always was relatively unimportant.     
 
There are two possible explanations for why the contribution of occupational segregation to 
the PT pay penalty has risen through time.  It could be that occupational segregation itself has 
risen so that the jobs done by FT and PT women are more different now than they were in the 
past.  Or, it could be that the wage rewards attached to different occupations has changed in 
such a way that a given level of occupational segregation leads to a larger pay penalty now 
than in the past.  In fact, we know that this is what has been happening in Britain over the 
past 25 years – there has been a big rise in wage inequality (see, for example, Machin, 2003) 
and a large part of this has been a rise in the earnings gap between those at the top e.g. 
managers and professionals and those at the bottom of the occupational pay ladder e.g 
cleaners and shop assistants. 
 
One way of disentangling these two explanations is to keep the occupational pay structure 
constant at its value in a particular year and then just change the occupational distribution.  
This is done in Figure 5.5.  The line labelled ‘Current Year Coefficients’ is the total 
contribution year-by-year of occupation to the overall pay penalty – this is the same as the 
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line showing the contribution of occupation in Figure 5.3.  Changes from year to year include 
both changes in the occupational segregation of FT and PT women and changes in the pay of 
different occupations.  The line labelled ‘1975 Pay Structure’ keeps the occupational pay 
differentials at their 1975 level so that changes year-on-year just represent changes in 
occupational segregation†††.  The PTPP would be about 5 percentage points lower in 2003 if 
we had kept the 1975 pay structure so that one half of the rise in the overall contribution of 
occupation to the PTPP is the result of changing occupational segregation and about half is 
the result of the changing occupational pay structure. As a check that this conclusion is not 
sensitive to the use of the 1975 pay structure we also show in the line labelled ‘2001 Pay 
Structure’ what happens if we use the 2001 pay structure.  The conclusions are very similar: 
the PTPP would have been 5 percentage points larger in 1975 if the occupational pay 
structure had been what it is today.  
 
So, a substantial part of the increase in the PT pay penalty is a by-product of the changes in 
the UK labour market that have led to more wage inequality. These changes have occurred 
across the whole labour market, are not specific to women and not specific to part-time 
status.  But they do have the effect of leading to a sizeable rise in the PT pay penalty.  There 
is a parallel here to the hypothesis of Blau and Kahn (2003) who argue that most of the 
variation in the total gender pay gap across countries can be ascribed to differences in the 
overall level of pay inequality and are not the result of gender-specific factors though they do 
have implications for pay differences by gender. 
 
But the changes in the occupational distribution of PT and FT work do explain part of the rise 
in the pay penalty.  Table 5.2 explores this in more detail, giving the occupational distribution 
of PT and FT workers in 1975 and 2001 using 9 broad categories, the change over this period 
and the difference in the change between FT and PT workers.  So while the proportion of 
workers who are managers or professionals has risen for both FT and PT workers over this 
period, the rise is much greater for FT workers and this will have acted to widen the pay 
penalty.  Similarly there has been a very large rise in the share of PT workers in sales and 
personal service occupations.  There are some changes in the opposite direction, notably a 
very large fall in the share of PT workers in the other occupations that tend to be low-paid.  
Table 5.2 suggests an occupational up-grading of FT women over this period that is much 
greater than that occurring among PT women although even PT women are, on average, in 
higher-level occupations now than they were in 1975. 
 
All of the analysis so far has suggested that the single most important factor in understanding 
the PT pay penalty is occupational segregation and we would go a long way in understanding 
the PT pay penalty if we could understand why it is that so many PT workers are in low-paid 
occupations and so few in high-level occupations and/or managers.  The next section tries to 
shed some light on this. 
 
 
6. Explaining the Job Segregation of PT and FT Workers 
 
Our previous analysis showed that there are very few PT women in senior, especially 
managerial, jobs and many in low-paid occupations and that this occupational segregation 
can explain most of the difference in average earnings between FT and PT women.  This 
occupational segregation can partly be explained by differences in education but only in part. 
                                                 
††† Note that, by construction the two lines must meet in 1975. 
 17
Why are there so few women working PT in high-level occupations?  Very crudely, there are 
three broad types of explanation.  First, it may be that all of the women with the requisite 
skills and experience to do high-level jobs choose to work FT rather than PT.  If this is the 
case then there is no particular problem with the occupational segregation we observe 
(though one might be concerned with the work-life balance issues this scenario poses).  
Secondly, it may be that the women with the necessary skills to do the high-level jobs and 
who want to work PT choose to do a lower-level occupation even though they could retain 
the higher-level one.  This might appear a curious choice but could emerge if, for example, 
having children caused some women to put more emphasis on family life and less on career.  
Thirdly, it may be that high-level occupations are simply not available on a PT basis so that 
women who are qualified to do these jobs but who would like, in an ideal world, to work PT 
in these jobs are forced to choose between working FT in the high-level job or working PT in 
a lower-level occupation.  In the last case the skills of women who work PT are being under-
utilised and this waste of human capital could be a source of concern.  If this is the situation 
we need to ask whether there are good reasons why certain jobs cannot be done on a PT basis 
or whether it is some combination of inertia, lack of imagination and prejudice on the part of 
employers.  
 
This section presents evidence pertaining to these issues though the precise elements of 
choice and constraint that are so important to the hypotheses described above are, ultimately, 
impossible to disentangle. 
 
Changes in Hours Status, Employers and Occupations 
 
Research in the US (e.g. Altonji and Paxson, 1988, 1992) and the Netherlands (Euwals, 2001) 
has documented that workers who want to change their hours of work often have to change 
employers to do so‡‡‡.  Table 6.1 presents some evidence on this from the LFS. 
 
Table 6.1 shows the rates of transition between FT and PT status and vice versa.  The first 
row tells us that 2.8% of women who are currently working FT were reported as working PT 
three months ago.  For women who are currently working PT, 3.8% were reported as working 
FT three months ago.  Also of some interest are the flows into FT and PT employment from 
workers who were not in employment 3 months ago.  The second and third rows show that 
1% of women who are currently working FT were unemployed three months ago and 0.9% 
were inactive.  For those women currently working PT 1.5% were unemployed and 4.2% 
inactive three months ago.  So, while flows into FT status are more likely to come from 
women who were previously working PT, flows into PT status are more likely to come from 
non-employment.  Other research (e.g. Gregg and Wadsworth, 2000) suggests that these entry 
jobs tend to be badly-paid.  For individuals who are not in employment but who have worked 
in the past 8 years, the LFS also reports previous FT/PT status.  Table 6.1 also reports the 
previous hours status of entrants into PT/FT work from non-employment.  The most striking 
fact is that over 80% of entrants into FT work from non-employment were also FT in their 
previous job and over 80% of entrants into PT work from non-employment were also PT in 
their previous job.  
 
Although the figures in Table 6.1 tell us about the labour market transitions between FT and 
PT work and vice versa, changes of jobs and occupations are also of some interest.  This is 
                                                 
‡‡‡ This is in contrast to the standard labour supply model of economists in which workers have freedom to alter 
hours of work at will within jobs. 
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reported in Table 6.2 where we report the fraction of women who are changing their 
employer and/or occupation by whether they have changed their hours status or not (by which 
we mean a shift from FT to PT status or vice versa).  One can see that women who change 
from FT to PT status and vice versa are much more likely to have a change of employer 
and/or occupation than are women who maintain their hours status.  17% of women who have 
shifted from FT to PT status have changed employer compared to 3.3% of those who 
remained FT.  Of those women who have moved from FT to PT status and changed employer 
73% have changed their narrowly-defined occupation and 57% their broadly-defined 
occupation.  For women remaining in FT status but changing employer the figures are 50% 
and 35%. 
 
But, even if women manage to make the transition from FT to PT status without changing 
employer, they are still more likely to change occupation than women who remain in FT 
status.  12% of women moving from FT to PT status change narrow occupation compared to 
7% of women remaining FT.   
 
It should be emphasized that moves from PT to FT status (and vice versa) also tend to be 
associated with changes in employer and occupation.  This evidence suggests that particular 
jobs with particular employers tend to be labelled as either FT or PT, and, to change hours 
status, many women have to change employers.  But, although these figures are suggestive 
they contain no information about the direction of occupational moves. 
 
The Direction of Occupational Mobility Among FT and PT Workers 
 
The direction of the occupational moves documented above is of some interest as, if women 
are managing to move up the occupational scale when they move from FT to PT status this is 
of much less concern than if they are moving downwards.  With 370 narrow occupations it is 
hard to summarize all the occupational moves and, indeed, to rank all the occupations on a 
one-dimensional scale.  So what we do is assign to each occupation the average wage among 
women in that occupation and then work out the change in the occupational wage associated 
with occupational moves.  So if, for example, a woman moved from being a nurse (average 
wage £10.06 per hour) to being a care assistant (average wage £5.41 per hour) – and we do 
see some transitions like this in our data – this would be recorded as a 46% fall in the average 
occupational wage. While this approach is somewhat crude (for example, Houston and 
Marks, 2003, show that much occupational down-grading suffered by women returning to 
work PT after maternity leave is quite subtle and not well-captured by their occupation) it 
does have the advantage of being able to summarize a large amount of information in a few 
numbers.    
 
The results are reported in Table 6.3.  In the first column we report results for all working 
women and in the second column for graduates as occupational down-grading may be more 
serious for them (as it is more likely they were initially in a well-paid job).  First, let us 
consider the results for all women. 
 
In the first row of Table 6.3 we regress the log of the occupational wage on controls for 
characteristics and a dummy for part-time status.  The reported number shows that, PT 
women are in occupations which, controlling for other factors, pay 13.8% less than the 
occupations in which FT women find themselves.  This estimate is in line with the overall 
contribution of occupation to the PTPP penalty that we reported above. The rest of Table 6.3 
provides some evidence about the source of this occupational segregation.   
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All employment spells must start with an entry from non-employment and the second panel 
of Table 6.3 presents some information for those women entering employment from non-
employment.  The second row provides an estimate of the part-time occupational pay penalty 
for those entering employment that is 14.4%, slightly above the overall PT occupational pay 
penalty.  Although this estimate of the occupational PTPP is very large it is vulnerable to the 
criticism that FT and PT women entering employment have very different levels of labour 
market experience and this is partly a source of the observed PTPP.  But, as the LFS contains 
information on previous occupation as long as the individual has worked within the last 8 
years, we can look at occupational mobility across a spell of intervening non-employment – if 
a woman once had a particular job then it is not unreasonable to think she might be able to do 
it again.  The third row of Table 6.3 presents an estimate of the occupational PTPP that is 
based on the change in the occupational wage.  One can see that returning to work part-time 
means women suffer a wage penalty of 7.5% compared to those who return to work FT after 
controlling for previous occupation. This is lower than wage penalty reported in the previous 
row implying that those returning to work PT tend to have previously been in relatively low-
paid occupations compared to those who are returning to work FT.  But, the fact that there is 
still a sizeable pay penalty suggests that returning to work PT is associated with downward 
occupational mobility§§§.  This is in line with other studies (Martin and Roberts, 1984; Joshi 
and Hinde, 1993; Blackwell, 2001; Houston and Marks, 2003) though, with the exception of 
Houston and Marks (2003) those other studies use data that is now quite old.  
 
One might still argue that the estimate of the occupational PTPP in the third row of Table 6.3 
does not control adequately for previous labour market experience.  So, in the fourth row we 
restrict the sample to those who previously worked FT – the occupational PTPP is now 
higher at 9.9%.  One might further argue that this does not control for the length of time since 
the previous job was left (this might be important because skills might atrophy over time).  
So, in the fifth column we restrict the sample to women who previously worked FT less than 
12 months ago so that the skills were very recently applied.  The estimate implies that those 
returning to work PT suffer an occupational PTPP of 7.8% suggesting that their skills are not 
being fully used.  As a further check on this conclusion the sixth row of Table 6.3 uses a 
sample of those women whose were PT in their previous job.  The estimate of 11.2% implies 
that those in this group who return to work FT do so in occupations that on average pay 
11.2% more than the occupations of those who return PT.  
 
But what happens within employment spells is also important so the third panel of Table 6.3 
reports some estimates for those women who were in employment both currently and 3 
months ago.  In the seventh row the sample is those women who were in FT employment 3 
months ago and the estimate implies that those women who are now working PT suffer an 
occupational PTPP of 2%.  This includes women who both change employer and those who 
do not.  As was seen in Table 6.2 we know that the women who have changed hours status 
are more likely to have changed employer.  The eighth row shows that among those women 
who were previously FT who have changed employer and have moved to PT status there is 
an occupational PTPP of 8.9% again suggesting that these women are no longer using all 
their skills.  In contrast, for those women who change hours status without changing 
employer there is a very small pay penalty of 0.2%.  This suggests that one of the ways to 
avoid suffering a PTPP is to change hours status without changing jobs.  The ninth, tenth and 
eleventh rows investigates the impact of moves from PT to FT status.  The ninth row shows 
                                                 
§§§ This estimate is conditional on those who report previous occupation that tends to be those who are returning 
to work after relatively short spells.  But, as this group has a similar part-time pay penalty to those who do not 
have this information, the bias is likely to be rather small. 
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that those moving from PT to FT status get an occupational pay premium of 4.4%.  For those 
women who make the transition from PT to FT status without changing employer there is a 
pay premium of 2.1% while for those who change employer it is 8.1%. 
 
Finally, we might be interested in changes in occupation among women who do not change 
hours status and who do not change employer.  As most of these moves are in an upward 
direction, this can be thought of as a promotion.  The twelfth row of Table 6.3 shows that PT 
workers are 0.1% less likely to change occupation than FT workers and the thirteenth row 
shows that, when they do change occupation the growth in occupational wages is 1.2% less 
for PT workers.  This suggests that women are less likely to be on a career track within 
employers.   
 
Table 6.3 has presented evidence that there is under-utilization of skills among PT workers.  
Perhaps the most telling pieces of evidence in this regard is that among women who move 
from FT to PT work with a change of employer there is an occupational pay penalty of 8.9% 
and for those who have worked FT in the past 12 months but who return to work PT there is 
an occupational pay penalty of 7.8%. 
 
If there is occupational down-grading and under-utilization of skills we might expect this to 
be more marked among highly-skilled workers for the simple reason that they have more to 
lose.  Consequently, the second column of Table 6.3 repeats the same exercises for graduates.  
One sees the same patterns as for all women but what is very striking is that the occupational 
PTPP for graduates entering employment from non-employment are very large – of the order 
of 17% rather than the 8% found for all women.  This does suggest a more acute problem 
with under-utilisation of skills among high-skill women.  
 
All of the differentials analysed in Tables 6.1 to 6.3 act to concentrate PT workers in low-
wage occupations.  They are more likely to be recent entrants from non-employment, they are 
less likely to have long spells of employment, they may be forced to make changes of 
employers and downward occupational moves if they want to work PT and they are less 
likely to be promoted if they remain with their current employer.  And the fact that certain 
occupations do not seem to be available on a PT basis is also likely to crowd those women 
who want to work PT into lower-level occupations, potentially lowering the wages in those 
occupations still further. 
 
Women with Nursing and Teaching Qualifications 
 
The evidence presented in Table 6.3 relies on rather indirect measures of skills, simply 
assuming that women who have done a particular job in the past can continue to do it in the 
future.  For some specific occupations we can get a clear idea of whether a woman has the 
necessary skills to work in that occupation and then we can see where these women are 
actually working.  The two clearest examples are perhaps teaching and nursing, both of which 
require specific qualifications information on which is contained in the LFS.  Table 6.4 
investigates the jobs being done by employed women with teaching or nursing qualifications 
PT and FT.  In the first two columns one can see that among women with a teaching 
qualification who are working 71% of those working FT are working as teachers but only 
56% of those working PT.  And, among those working FT 9.5% of women with a teaching 
qualification are working in equivalent or ‘higher’-level occupations compared to only 4.7% 
of those working PT.  The consequence is that 38.5% of women with a teaching qualification 
who are working PT are working in lower-level occupations – 12% in associate professional 
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jobs, 10% in clerical jobs, and 9% in personal services.  There does seem to be under-
utilisation of their skills. 
 
Among those with a nursing qualification the third and fourth columns of Table 6.4 shows 
that the proportion working as health and social welfare associate professionals (the group 
that contains nursing) is very similar for both those working FT (63%) and PT (64%).  But 
there are big differences in the jobs being done by those who are not working in health.  
Among qualified nurses who are working FT and not as nurses, we see 19% in higher-level 
occupations and 16% in lower-level occupations.  But among qualified nurses who are 
working PT there are 8.5% in higher-level occupations and 23% in lower-level occupations 
with 14% in personal service occupations.  Again there seems to be under-utilisation of skills 
among qualified nurses who work PT. 
 
Why Are Good Jobs Not Available on a PT Basis? 
 
We have presented evidence that women who are working PT are often not making full use 
of their skills and experience.  There are a number of possible reasons for this reflecting the 
elements of choice and constraint that may be important.  First it may be that, for some 
reason, women choose to take a lower-level occupation when working PT even though the 
high-level job would be available on a PT basis.  Or it may be that the constraint of working 
PT limits the distance women are prepared to travel to work because travel-to-work is a fixed 
cost (and PT women do have lower commuting times than FT women) restricting the range 
of jobs available and resulting in under-utilization of skills (this argument could only work 
for women who work fewer hours per day rather than those who work fewer days per week).  
Or it could be that employers simply refuse to offer certain jobs on a PT basis.  In turn there 
may be good reasons for this or it may be the result of prejudice?   
 
A number of arguments have been put forward in the economics literature for why there may 
be a pay penalty attached to PT work.  For example, Barzel (1973) argues that there are set-
up costs in many jobs and productive work only starts once these set-up costs have been met.  
As PT workers then spend a lower proportion of their time at work on productive tasks, it is 
argued that their average hourly productivity and hence their wage will be lower.  This 
argument would seem to apply best where there are daily set-up costs though this then limits 
the applicability of the argument to those PT workers who work fewer hours per day and not 
those who work fewer days per week.  And, as we have seen that there are very small pay 
differences between PT and FT workers within occupations, this would also seem to suggest 
that this argument is not that important in practice. 
 
One type of set-up costs is the fixed costs of hiring, training and administering workers.  A 
PT worker probably costs as much as a FT worker to train or to hire or to administer, but the 
number of hours worked over which an employer can get a return on these costs is lower.  As 
a result, employers will only be prepared to pay PT workers lower wages than FT workers or, 
if they are forced to pay similar wages, they will be more likely to employ FT workers in 
these types of jobs.  Montgomery (1988) provides evidence for this effect.  As high-level jobs 
typically require more training and are more costly to fill, this could explain the deficit of PT 
workers in high-level occupations.  This view means that we would expect employers to look 
more favourably on existing workers who want to shift from FT to PT work (because the 
fixed costs of hiring and training have already been paid) than on hiring workers who want to 
be PT from the start. 
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All workers work with capital that costs money for the employer to provide and employers 
need to generate a return on capital equal to that available elsewhere in the economy. As 
capital is not being used in a productive way when workers are not at work, PT workers may 
not earn as much as FT workers if the utilization rate of the capital they work with is lower.  
Whether this is the case or not depends very much on the particular employer – capital can be 
shared among workers and, to the extent that it is, this will reduce the importance of this 
effect.  And there are forces that go in the opposite direction.  In many service occupations 
e.g. shops, restaurants, bars and personal services, productive work can only be done when 
customers are present.  FT workers may be at work at times when there are very few 
customers reducing their productivity.  If PT work can be targeted on peak times in customer 
demand one might expect hourly earnings to be higher among PT workers than FT workers.    
 
Coordination costs also have potential to explain why PT workers may receive lower hourly 
wages than FT workers and why certain types of jobs may only be available on a FT basis.  
For example, a manager may have to give verbal instructions to workers on what to do – if 
there is one FT worker these instructions need only be given once while if there are two PT 
workers they may have to be given twice.  And if the job of supervising some workers is split 
between two PT managers they may have to spend time communicating with each other 
about the problems they have had – this liaison will, again, cost money.  And if groups of 
workers need to meet to discuss problems this is easier if all the workers are working FT 
because it may be easier to find a time when they are all in the office.  Of course, there are 
often ways around these problems with a little imagination and it may be that inertia is as 
important an obstacle to making certain jobs available on a PT basis than any insurmountable 
problems to the organization of work posed by PT workers.  
 
Which, if any, of these effects are important in practice?  We do have some evidence on 
employer attitudes to PT working (and other flexible working practices) though this is an area 
where more research is needed.  For example, the 2003 Employer Work-Life Balance Study 
(Woodland et al, 2004) provides a wide range of information on employer attitudes.  They 
find that employers are generally supportive of the desire of workers to balance life and work 
primarily because they think this leads to a more contented and productive workforce.  But 
there is evidence that employers do make it difficult for women to change from FT to PT 
work.  For example, Woodland et al (2004) report that 60% of employers would expect to 
allow a woman returning from maternity leave to shift from FT to PT work and 65% of these 
would allow this with the woman retaining their previous job and seniority.  These figures 
imply serious problems for women wanting to shift from FT to PT work when returning to 
work after maternity leave – 40% would be forced to change employer and another 20% 
would be forced to accept a lower-status job.  And Woodland et al (2004) show that employer 
attitudes towards women returning after maternity leave are the most favourable – for other 
women fewer employers reported being likely to be so accommodating.  The reasons given 
by employers were almost exclusively related to business considerations.     
 
Another study with relevant evidence on the attitudes of British employers to PT working is 
the case study research reported in Casey, Metcalf and Millward (1997).  24 employers in a 
range of sectors were interviewed about their attitudes to PT working as part of a wider 
investigation into their use of flexible labour.  Their study makes it clear that employers do 
tend to label certain jobs as available or unavailable on a PT basis and conclude that 
“perceived advantages and disadvantages of a particular working-time practice are affected 
not only be objective facts but may also be affected by prejudice” (p119).  Employers tended 
to see advantages in using part-time workers in tasks where workload varied over the course 
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of a working day (e.g. in shops), where there was not enough work for a FT worker and in 
making their jobs more attractive to women.  However, employers also saw disadvantages in 
fixed administrative costs, higher rates of labour turnover, lower flexibility in working hours 
and the need in professional and administrative jobs the need to hire more people and the 
costs of liaison among them.  This last factor might be thought to be especially pertinent to 
the lack of PT managers. 
 
One way of getting some idea of the factors at work is to look at the relationship between 
hours worked and the fraction of managers who are PT – this is done in Figure 6.1.  One sees 
that there is a marked rise in the proportion around 35 hours a week – among those working 
around 30 hours a week only 6.6% are managers but among those working around 40 hours a 
week 17.4% are.  It is hard to rationalise such a discontinuity as the result of a rational policy 
on the part of employers about ‘managers must work 35 and not 34 hours a week’ – it is more 
likely to reflect a blanket perception that ‘this job cannot be done on a PT basis’. 
 
Conclusion 
 
There is evidence of a lack of flexibility in hours within jobs so that women who want to 
work fewer hours often have to change employers and/or occupation in order to realize those 
desires.  Furthermore these changes tend to be associated with downward occupational 
mobility that is particularly large for graduates.  This represents not just a cost for the women 
themselves but a cost for the economy as a whole as it implies that the skills of many PT 
women are not being fully utilized.  The net effect is that one sees very few women working 
PT in managerial and professional jobs.  Although there are some reasons for why it may be 
more difficult to make such jobs available on a part-time basis, it may also be that there is a 
measure of inertia and prejudice involved.  More research is needed on why so few good jobs 
seem to be available on a PT basis.   
 
 
7. International Comparisons of the Part-Time Pay Penalty 
 
The experience of other countries is of considerable interest in determining whether the UK 
situation of a large PTPP that is primarily the result of occupational segregation of FT and PT 
workers is unique and, if it is not, to try to identify any policies pursued in other countries 
that might usefully be applied to the UK.   
 
The comparative part of the project uses data from the European Community Household 
Panel Survey (ECHPS). This is a household-based panel survey, containing annual 
information on a few thousands households per country. The ECHPS has the advantage that it 
asks a consistent set of questions across the 15 members of the pre-enlargement EU.**** The 
Employment section of the survey contains information on the jobs held by members of 
selected households, including whether they work PT and why. Several indices of job 
satisfaction are also reported, both overall satisfaction and satisfaction with specific job 
attributes. 
 
                                                 
**** The initial sample sizes are as follows. Austria: 3,380; Belgium: 3490; Denmark: 3,482; Finland: 4,139; 
France: 7,344; Germany: 11,175; Greece: 5,523; Ireland: 4,048; Italy: 7,115; Luxembourg: 1,011; Netherlands: 
5,187; Portugal: 4,881; Spain: 7,206; Sweden: 5,891; U.K.: 10,905. These figures are the number of household 
included in the first wave for each country, which corresponds to 1995 for Austria, 1996 for Finland, 1997 for 
Sweden, and 1994 for all other countries. 
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Consistently with the previous analysis on LFS data, we use a measure of PT status based on 
self-assessment in our analysis on European data. It should be noted however, that such 
information is missing for a relative large number of observations in countries that switched 
from the ECHPS sample to national surveys during the ECHPS sample period, namely the 
U.K, Germany and Luxembourg. For these countries we complement the information on self-
assessed PT status, whenever missing, with information on the number of hours worked. We 
thus include among part-timers those for whom the self assessed PT status is missing and the 
number of weekly hours worked is lower than 30 (25 for teachers). 
 
All evidence that follows is based on female employees aged 15-64 not in full-time 
education. As the sampling procedures adopted in the ECHPS are not necessarily consistent 
across countries and, specifically, they changed during the survey period for the UK, 
Germany and Luxembourg, the evidence reported here is constructed using the sample 
weights given in the survey. 
 
What Type of Women Work Part-Time in the EU? 
 
Table 7.1 presents data on the percentage of part-time work in total employment as well as 
other indicators of the labour market position of women in the EU countries. The first piece 
of evidence that stands out in column 1 is that the incidence of part-time work varies 
substantially across European countries, going from just over 50% in the Netherlands to 
around 10% in Portugal, Greece and Finland. At the risk of some over-simplification there 
are three broad groups of countries.  In the Nordic countries female labour force participation 
is very high but most of these women are working full-time and the incidence of part-time 
work is quite low.  In the northern and central European countries (including the UK) female 
labour force participation is somewhat lower but there is a much higher incidence of part-
time work.  Finally in the southern European countries female labour force participation is 
low and the incidence of part-time working is also low.  Not all countries fit neatly into these 
categories – Portugal seems closest to the Nordic countries in many ways – but this 
classification is useful to bear in mind. 
  
Except in Scandinavia, where parental leave legislation and well-developed child-care 
provisions may allow mothers to combine family tasks and FT work, there seems to be a 
trade-off across countries between the share of women working FT and female labour market 
participation. In this perspective it should be noted that the UK has both one of the highest 
female participation rates and one of the highest PT employment rates in the EU. 
  
Tables 7.2 to 7.7 present descriptive statistics on what type of women work PT in the EU and 
why. With only a few exceptions, part-time incidence increases with age (Table 7.2), 
especially in countries with a relatively large share of part-time jobs, such as the UK, the 
Netherlands and Ireland, and decreases with both educational qualifications (Table 7.3) and 
occupation (Table 7.4). Interestingly, in the UK and the Netherlands part-time jobs are 
particularly used in two of the broad occupations considered, namely service and sales 
workers and elementary occupations, where the share of part-time work for women is above 
60%. Although the ECHPS does not allow as detailed a classification of occupations as the 
LFS and the NES, Table 7.4 confirms that other countries with large numbers of PT workers 
also have high degrees of occupational segregation and this experience is not unique to the 
UK.  The deficit of PT workers in high-level occupations, notably managers, seems to be 
somewhat weaker in the southern European countries with low levels of female labour force 
participation.  As mentioned before one must make a distinction between countries in which a 
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low occupational segregation between FT and PT women is the result of few opportunities 
for good jobs being available even to FT women and those in which it is the result of good 
opportunities being available to PT women. For this reason Table 7.5 presents the 
occupational distribution of employment among FT and PT women separately.  This shows 
that the relatively good occupational position of PT relative to FT women in the Southern 
European countries is more because these countries have very few FT female managers than 
because they have large numbers of PT female managers.  In Table 7.5 the UK stands out as 
having the highest proportion of FT female workers as managers though it does not stand out 
as having lots of PT female workers as managers.  
 
Looking next at the household structure of employees, Table 7.6 shows that both marriage 
and the presence of children in the household increase the probability of a woman working 
part-time, and this effect is stronger in the U.K, Germany, Ireland, and especially in the 
Netherlands, than elsewhere. In other words, the very high part-time incidence in a few 
northern or central European countries is associated with women’s domestic commitments. 
Single women without children seem to work relatively more similar hours across Europe 
than those married and/or with children.  
 
The use of part-time work for combining paid work and family or other commitments should 
be associated with a lower incidence of involuntary part-time work. We would therefore 
expect that in countries where domestic commitments explain much of the incidence of part-
time work among women, PT working women are less likely to consider themselves as 
involuntary part-timers.  Information on why women hold part-time jobs is presented in Table 
7.7, which shows that between a half and 80% of female part-timers in Germany, the 
Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, Austria and Ireland work shorter hours in order to care 
after children or other family members. This proportion falls to less than one third in southern 
European countries, where the most frequent reason why women hold part-time jobs is 
because they could not find a full-time one.  
 
The picture that emerges from these pieces of evidence can be summarized by saying that in 
northern and central Europe women with children want to work and tend to work part-time so 
that PT work appears to be a voluntary choice for most women in that situation.  On the 
contrary, in southern European countries (including France) where fewer women (and 
especially women with children) want PT work, the incidence of involuntary part-time work 
is higher. The UK seems to fit quite well in the northern European model, with a very low 
incidence (6.7%) of involuntary part-time. 
 
Although there are differences, the general pattern of PT working among in the EU countries 
is similar to the UK.  PT women are more likely to have lower levels of education, to be 
married, to have children and to be in low-level occupations.  
 
The Part-Time Pay Penalty in the EU 
 
To assess the part-time pay penalty (or premium) in the EU we use specifications of wage 
equations that are as comparable as possible to those estimated earlier using the UK LFS 
data. However, due to data limitations and to the relatively small sample size of the ECHPS, 
the set of controls used here is more limited than that used for the UK analysis.  
 
In particular, we exclude both job tenure and employer size from the estimated wage 
equations. The information on the start of the current job is unavailable for 22% and long job 
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spells are under-represented. For this reason we chose not to use information on job tenure 
rather over-represent short job spells in our sample. The information on employer size was 
initially collected for workers in the private sector only. After the initial wave, the employer 
size was collected for public sector workers as well, but as most information on the current 
job is only collected when a worker changes job since the previous year, this variable is 
missing for most public sector employees. We thus chose to retain public sector employees in 
our sample and not to use information on employer size.  
 
Table 7.8 presents evidence on the part-time pay gap, based on alternative specifications of 
the wage equation. Column 1 reports the unadjusted PTPP.  The UK stands out here with the 
largest unadjusted PTPP of 23.5%, similar to our earlier estimates on LFS data. Outside the 
U.K., the PTPP is everywhere below 20%, and in most cases below 10%. It is noticeable that 
there is no significant pay penalty in Belgium and Austria and actually a pay premium to 
part-time jobs in Germany, Italy and Greece.††††  
 
As we use a subjective definition of part-time work, we do not further distinguish between 
“short” and “long” part-time hours. On this issue, work by Hu and Tijdens (2003) shows that 
short and long part-time carry similar pay penalties with respect to full-time work in the U.K. 
(this is in line with our earlier LFS results), while in the Netherlands there is no significant 
pay gap between long part-time work and full-time work but there is one between long PT 
jobs and short PT jobs. 
 
The estimates in column 2 control for a number of worker and job characteristics and those in 
column 3 also control for occupation (19 categories). The estimates of the PTPP in both 
columns assume there is no variation in the PTPP across individuals.  As more controls are 
included, the estimated PTPP is reduced, implying that part-time workers tend to have 
relatively low wage characteristics such as lower education, and to be over-represented in low 
wage sectors or occupations. Specifically, the simple inclusion of occupation dummies in 
column 3 roughly halves the estimated part-time pay gap in several countries. However, as a 
smaller set of controls are used here than in the UK analysis on LFS data, the adjusted 
estimate of the PTPP remains larger than the estimates reported in the earlier part of the 
report.  In the ECHPS data the UK still stands out as the country with the largest part of the 
PTPP that cannot be accounted for by differences in characteristics between PT and FT 
women. 
 
The estimates of the PTPP in columns 4-7 of Table 7.8 are based on a statistical model where 
the PTPP is allowed to vary with the characteristics of the woman.  As in Section 4 we 
present estimates of the PTPP for the average FT and PT woman, and we also present 
estimates that both exclude (columns 4 and 5) and include (columns 6 and 7) controls for 
occupation. These estimates of the PTPP are quite similar to those based on the assumption of 
a constant PTPP. 
 
                                                 
†††† It should be noted however that our estimates of the part-time pay premium in Germany contrast with the 
findings of related work by Bardasi and Gornick (2003) on data from the Luxemboug Income Study and 
Gustafsson et al. (2003) on GSOEP data. Both studies tend to find a penalty to part-timer work in Germany. The 
difference between our and their findings may be due to slight differences in specification (for example Bardasi 
and Gornick control for women’s endogenous selection into part-time jobs) and inherent data differences (if 
hours of work are measured with error and measurement error may differ across data sources, this may lead to 
different estimates of the part-time penalty in hourly earnings). 
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The estimates in Table 7.8 suggest that the reason why the UK has the highest unadjusted 
PTPP in Europe is partly because FT and PT women are very dissimilar (in terms of 
earnings) in the UK (one can get an idea of how important this is by taking the difference in 
the estimates of the PTPP in columns 1 and 3 of Table 7.8) and because it has the largest 
adjusted PTPP (as one can see by looking at the estimates in the third column).  
 
There are two possible reasons why the FT and PT women should be most dissimilar in the 
UK.  The first is that the differences in the characteristics between FT and PT women really 
are the largest in the UK and the second is that a given level of dissimilarity in characteristics 
translates into a higher PTPP because of the high level of wage inequality in the UK.  So if, 
for example, the pay gap between managers and cleaners is largest in the UK then a given 
level of occupational segregation will result in a higher observed level of the PTPP in the 
UK. 
 
Table 7.9 explores this issue in more detail. Consider, first, the top half of the table. The first 
column reports the unadjusted PTPP. The second column then reports the part of this 
unadjusted PTPP that can be explained by the different characteristics of FT and PT women 
using the returns to different characteristics observed for FT women observed in that country. 
This shows that the UK is fourth in the EU behind Portugal, Spain and Ireland in terms of the 
difference between FT and PT women. The third column then works out what part of the 
unadjusted PTPP can be explained by the differences in characteristics between FT and PT 
women if they had the UK pay structure for FT women‡‡‡‡.  In the Nordic countries and the 
Netherlands this makes a very large difference: this is because these countries have a 
relatively equal pay structure so that differences in characteristics between FT and PT women 
result in lower pay differentials between them.  But, in the other countries the use of the UK 
pay structure does not have a very large effect.   
 
The final two columns of Table 7.9 do the same exercise but by using the PT returns to 
characteristics.  The results are largely similar but it is worth mentioning with respect to the 
previous 2 columns is that in southern Europe the portion of the part-time wage gap 
explained when using U.K. coefficients in is slightly higher. If anything, it seems therefore 
that lower returns to characteristics in southern Europe with respect to the U.K. apply to part-
time even more than to full-time jobs. 
 
The same exercise can be repeated for each characteristic taken individually.  When doing 
this, the most important observable factor in explaining the PTPP, was the occupational 
distribution of workers (the impact of other characteristics such as education or age being 
often negligible or zero).  In the lower panel of Table 7.9 we thus report the part of the PTPP 
explained by the differences in occupations, using again own and U.K. coefficients.  Relative 
to the total wage gap, the role of occupation in predicting the average wage of part-timers 
seems stronger in southern Europe, where the part-time wage gap is relatively lower and in 
some cases negative, than in the UK. 
 
                                                 
‡‡‡‡ In order to use U.K. coefficients for evaluating the PTPP in other countries we need to use an identical 
specification for the part-time and full-time wage equations for all countries. In practice this means that, if in 
any country the cell corresponding to a given sector or occupation is empty, or only includes either full-timers or 
part-timers, then observations belonging to the given sectors or occupations need to be dropped for all countries. 
This reduces somewhat the size of the sample used, and the results obtained on the reduced sample may not be 
strictly comparable to those presented in Table 7.8. 
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Occupational Mobility and Job Segregation 
 
The estimates in Table 7.9 suggest that the UK has the fourth highest level of occupational 
segregation among the EU countries (in only Portugal, Spain and Ireland is it higher).  In 
section 6 of the report we showed that British women who want to change from FT to PT 
work often have to change employers and jobs and job changes tend to be associated with 
downward occupational mobility.  It is of some interest to see whether there are similar 
problems in other EU countries or whether some have successfully made transitions between 
FT and PT work easier.  
 
Table 7.10 presents information for the EU countries on transitions rates between FT and PT 
status and from non-employment into employment.  The information is the same as that 
presented for the UK in Table 6.1.  The estimates for the UK in Tables 6.1 and 7.10 differ in 
part because, in the ECHPS, we can only look at transitions over a one-year period whereas 
Table 6.1 was based on transitions over a 3-month period.  
 
Table 7.10 shows that, on average, 5% of women working part-time switch to full-time each 
year in the EU, and 11% of women working full-time switch to part-time. International 
comparisons show that the U.K. is among the countries with the highest mobility from part-
time to full-time and lowest mobility from full-time to part-time. The Nordic countries stand 
out as having extremely high rates of transition between FT and PT work.  In all countries, 
the proportion of workers who had a spell of unemployment and, even more, an inactivity 
spell just before the start of the current job is higher for part-timers than full-timers.  But the 
UK (and the Netherlands is also very similar) stands out as the country in which there is the 
greatest difference between FT and PT workers in the fraction of workers entering that hours 
status from non-employment.  
 
Table 7.10 says nothing about how changes in employer and occupation are associated with 
changes in hours status.  We present such information in Table 7.11 (the analogous table for 
the UK earlier in the report is Table 6.2).  In Table 7.11 we report the proportion of workers 
who are changing employer and the proportions who are changing occupation both in an 
upward and a downward direction (where the direction of the move is determined by 
comparison of the average wage in the old and the new occupation).  In the top panel of 
Table 7.11 we report these job mobility rates for workers who change hours status and, in the 
bottom panel, we report it for those who do not change hours status.  
 
A comparison of the two panels of Table 7.11 shows that, in most countries, workers who 
change hours status are more likely to change both employer and occupation than those 
women who do not change hours status. On average 16% of transitions to full-time jobs 
involve occupational promotions, while only 8% involve occupational demotions. On the 
other hand, 10% of transitions from FT to PT work have a promotion and 12% a demotion. 
So the UK pattern is not unique: women in all countries seem to find it hard to change hours 
status while keeping their current job (Sweden stands out as a notable exception). But the UK 
does stand out as having the highest rate of downward occupational mobility among women 
moving from FT to PT status when it is very average in its rate of downward occupational 
mobility for those who maintain their hours status. At the same time, the UK has the second 
highest (and the Netherlands is only slightly higher) rate of upward occupational mobility for 
women moving from PT to FT work.  This suggests very big differences in the UK in the 
types of jobs available on a FT and a PT basis. So, the UK does seem to have a particular 
problem with downward occupational mobility among PT women. The countries in which 
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this problem seems relatively small are France, Italy and Finland (Sweden should perhaps 
also be included here though we do not have the necessary information on occupational 
mobility). 
 
The bottom panel of Table 7.11 shows that the prospects of promotion are only slightly 
higher for full-time workers than PT women in most countries of the sample. The bulk of 
occupational segregation for part-time workers seems therefore to stem from lower starting 
occupation rather than from significantly lower upward mobility. 
 
Are PT Workers “Overqualified”?  
 
One of the advantages of the ECHPS over the UK LFS is that it contains direct information 
on the utilisation of skills in the form of a question that asks interviewees whether they feel 
that they have skills or qualifications to do a more demanding job than the one they currently 
hold.  As we have presented evidence above that PT women are concentrated into lower-level 
occupations we might expect to see more evidence of ‘over-qualification’ for PT than FT 
women.  And, because this problem seems particularly acute in the UK we might expect to 
see a particularly large difference in this country. 
 
Of course, the information in this question is highly subjective: a feeling of over-qualification 
is related to the difference in perception between what one thinks one can do and what one is 
doing.  Low self-esteem may lower the estimate of what one can do and result in an 
artificially low measured level of the under-utilisation of skills.  This note of caution needs to 
be kept in mind in the discussion that follows. 
 
Table 7.12 reports the proportion of women who report to feel overqualified for their current 
jobs by hours status. In general a very large proportion of women feel overqualified, but there 
is no systematic tendency for this to be more marked among PT workers.  In particular in the 
UK the reported level of over-education is higher for FT than PT women – in fact, the 
reported level of over-qualification among FT British women is the highest in the EU.  It is 
possible that these raw figures are misleading as they fail to control for other factors relevant 
to over-qualification.  Consequently the third column of Table 7.12 reports the difference in 
reported over-education between PT and FT women after controlling for other relevant 
factors.  But these results do no more than confirm the evidence found on the raw data: while 
there are some countries in which indeed women working part-time are more likely to feel 
overqualified than women working full-time, this is not the norm. For example, in Denmark 
and Portugal part-timers are actually less likely to feel overqualified than full-timers, while in 
a number of countries, including the U.K., there are no significant differences in perceptions 
of overqualification between part-timers and full-timers. 
 
Job Satisfaction in PT Jobs 
 
Finally, we consider the impact of part-time work on levels of job satisfaction. The ECHPS 
collects information on subjective job satisfaction, both overall and associated with specific 
aspects of a job, namely job security, earnings, working hours, type of work, working time 
and working conditions.  
 
Satisfaction levels are measured on a scale 1-5, from very dissatisfied to very satisfied. Table 
7.13 reports average levels of these indexes by country and hours status. On average, full-
timers are more satisfied with their earnings and job security, but less satisfied with working 
 30
hours, working times and working conditions. Also, the part-time penalty to job satisfaction 
seems to be higher in southern Europe than in the north. 
 
We also estimate the impact of PT status on levels of job satisfaction, controlling for relevant 
worker and job characteristics§§§§. The results are reported in Table 7.14, panel (a), where the 
figures represent the coefficients on a part-time dummy.  
 
Looking at overall job satisfaction first, there seem to be systematic differences between 
northern and central Europe, where part-time either does not affect job satisfaction or even 
increases it (and especially so in the U.K.), and southern Europe, where part-time is 
everywhere associated with lower job satisfaction. There are, however, two exceptions to this 
international pattern, namely Finland and Ireland, where satisfaction is lower on part-time 
jobs. 
 
Whether the U.K. premium in satisfaction on part-time jobs exists because women are 
particularly satisfied on part-time jobs or particularly dissatisfied in full-time jobs is another 
interesting question. To answer this question one can compare average levels of job 
satisfaction on full-time jobs in the EU, as shown in Table 7.12. It turns out that on average 
full-time women in the U.K. are more satisfied than in southern Europe, but less satisfied 
than in other countries. Relatively low satisfaction on full-time jobs in the U.K. can thus play 
a role in explaining its premium in satisfaction on part-time jobs vis-à-vis central and 
northern Europe, but not vis-à-vis southern Europe. 
 
Looking at specific aspects of job satisfaction, it can be noted that the U.K. is generally 
performing quite well both in absolute terms and relatively to other European countries, while 
southern European countries tend to perform worse than average.   
 
There is something of a paradox here: British women who work part-time seem to suffer a 
larger pay penalty than those in other European countries and suffer higher rates of 
downward occupational mobility when they move from FT to PT work yet they have higher 
levels of job satisfaction, even as far as earnings are concerned. In particular, satisfaction 
with earnings is particularly low in southern Europe, where on average there is not a large 
PTPP, and in some cases a pay premium. One possible interpretation of these pieces of 
evidence is that, as the incidence of involuntary part-time in southern Europe is higher than in 
the north, southern European women would expect a compensating wage differential for 
working part-time, and they are therefore less satisfied with their earnings, all else being 
equal. To explore this possibility we re-estimate similar satisfaction equations after excluding 
from our sample all women who declared to hold a part-time job because they could not find 
a temporary one. The results are reported in panel (b) of Table 7.14. Dropping involuntary 
part-timers indeed lowers the penalty in job satisfaction with earnings in southern Europe, but 
it should be noted that, at the same time, it increases the associated satisfaction premium in 
the north. Women working part-time in southern Europe are thus consistently less satisfied 
with their jobs than women working FT while this is not true in northern European countries 
(including the UK). 
 
                                                 
§§§§ For the technically inclined, we estimate an ordered probit model. 
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Lessons from the Experience of Other Countries 
 
We have used the ECHPS data to document that the problems facing women who want to 
work PT in the UK are not unique: they exist in some form in every other EU country.  On 
‘objective’ criteria like the level of the PTPP and downward occupational mobility associated 
with moves into PT work, the UK does seem to be doing worse than other countries although 
on ‘subjective’ criteria like job satisfaction and measure of ‘over-qualification’ the UK seems 
to be performing much better.  But this does raise the question of whether there are any 
features of the labour market in other EU countries that could act as a role model for the UK. 
 
In the Southern EU countries the differences between FT and PT women are less marked in 
many respects than in the UK - especially in the PTPP - but they do not seem a good role 
model for the UK as many PT workers are in that situation because they cannot find the FT 
job they want and the gap between FT and PT women is small more because FT women do 
not do particularly well in those countries than because the PT women do well.  The Nordic 
countries look to be a more attractive role model.  In these countries, women seem to have 
greater flexibility in choosing the hours they want to work although rather few women in 
these countries choose to work PT (probably because of the well-developed system of 
childcare provision and parental leave entitlements).  There is occupational segregation 
between FT and PT women in the Nordic countries, perhaps on a level similar to that in the 
UK, but the more compressed pay structure means that this does not produce as big a pay gap 
as it does in the UK. 
      
The position in the UK is broadly somewhat similar to that in a set of central European 
countries (Germany, Netherlands, Belgium and Austria), in which part-time work is very 
widespread, carries a relatively small pay penalty with respect to full-time work, and in 
several cases a premium in terms of job satisfaction. These countries thus seem to be the best 
performers in terms of part-time employment in Europe. The UK seems to do as well as the 
“central European model” as far as satisfaction on part-time jobs is concerned, but worse in 
the associated pay gap. 
 
Finally, Ireland seems to be the worst performing country in part-time employment. Part-time 
work in Ireland is widely used, but it carries both a high wage penalty (second only to the 
U.K.) and also a high satisfaction penalty.  
 
Conclusions 
 
PT work in other EU countries has similar problems to the UK. However, there exists 
substantial international variation in the PTPP, as well as in other aspects of PT work. In 
particular, PT work in the UK seems to be characterised by the highest pay penalty. This is 
because the UK displays a relatively large difference between FT and PT women, and also 
the highest unexplained penalty, due to different wage rewards of given characteristics on FT 
and PT jobs. Among observable differences between FT and PT women, in all countries the 
main source of the PTPP is the segregation of PT workers in low-wage occupations. The 
extent of occupational segregation is not always higher in the UK than elsewhere, but a given 
level of segregation translates into a higher PTPP in the UK due to a higher overall wage 
inequality.  
 
Evidence on job mobility shows that the UK has the highest rates of promotions and 
demotions when women move from FT to PT and from PT to FT, respectively, suggesting 
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important differences in the jobs available on a FT and a PT basis in the UK. Finally, the UK 
performs slightly better than the EU average regarding the degree of under-utilisation of 
skills on PT jobs, and significantly better than virtually all other countries in terms of levels 
of satisfaction on PT jobs.  
 
 
8. Policy Options 
 
What can be done about the PT pay penalty?  As our previous discussion has made clear the 
main cause of the pay gap between FT and PT women is the different types of jobs that these 
women do. And these differences seem to be the result of the fact that certain jobs do not 
seem to be available on a PT basis.  It seems likely that any policy that fails to have an impact 
on this occupational segregation will fail to reduce the PTPP.   
 
Minimum Standards Policies 
 
Because women working PT tend to be in the jobs in the economy with the lowest level of 
wages any policy that reduces wage inequality will tend to improve the relative position of 
PT women even if that policy is not directly targeted on them.  We have already seen 
evidence of this in the fact that Nordic countries have low levels of overall wage inequality 
and a small PTPP even though they have quite high levels of occupational segregation.  
 
In the UK the most important recent initiative to reduce wage inequality has been the 
National Minimum Wage (NMW) introduced in April 1999.  This was initially set at the rate 
of £3.60 per hour for adults and has been raised periodically and is now £4.50 and will rise to 
£4.85 in October 2004.  Because PT women are more likely to be low-paid than FT women 
this has affected more PT workers than FT workers (Low Pay Commission, 2003, estimates 
that 53% of the beneficiaries from the NMW are part-time women and only 17% are FT 
women).  Hence we would expect the NMW to have reduced the PTPP.    
 
Figure 8.1 shows the percentage growth in hourly wages at different percentiles (up to the 
third decile) in the wage distribution of PT and FT women for the period April 1998 to April 
2000 that straddles the introduction of the NMW in April 1999*****.  One can see that there 
was faster wage growth at the bottom end of the hourly wage distribution, something that is 
consistent with the impact of the NMW.  One can also see that the impact of the NMW 
reaches further up the PT wage distribution (to about the 12th percentile) than the FT wage 
distribution (where it barely reaches the 5th percentile) and that the percentage wage increase 
at a given percentile is larger for PT women than for FT women.  All of this is consistent with 
the NMW having a larger impact on the pay of PT than FT women. 
 
However the actual impact of the NMW on the PTPP implied by Figure 8.1 is small.  One 
can get a measure of this impact by taking the difference between the two lines in Figure 8.1 
– this adds up to about 1 percentage point†††††.  This is consistent with Figure 1.1 where it is 
hard to see any dramatic change in the PTPP in 1999 when the NMW was introduced.  This 
is because the NMW has been set at a modest level. Other studies have found that the NMW 
has had a modest impact on overall wage inequality (Dickens and Manning, 2004) and on the 
                                                 
***** We do not use the NES for April 1999 as that data is exactly at the time of introduction of the NMW and 
almost certainly contains pay information relating to both before and after the introduction. 
††††† This might be a slight under-estimate of the impact of the NMW on the PTPP as the NES is known to 
under-sample low-paid part-time workers and we have not attempted to correct for this.  
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gender pay gap (Robinson, 2002) and our finding here is in line with these studies.    Unless 
the NMW is set at a considerably higher level it is not going to have a large effect on the 
PTPP. 
 
Some other minimum standards policies may have had more effect.  For example, the EU 
Working Time Directive that came into force in the UK in 1998 mandated a minimum of 4 
weeks paid holiday a year (pro rata for PT workers who do not work 5 days a week).  Prior to 
this there had been a substantial gap in the holiday entitlement of PT and FT workers and this 
has been markedly reduced since the directive came into force.  Figure 8.2 shows the change 
over the period 1992-2003 in the average number of days of paid holiday for FT and PT 
women – there is a marked improvement in the position of PT women around the 
introduction of the Working Time Directive.  And Figure 8.3 shows a large reduction around 
this time in the percentage of PT women with no paid holiday. 
 
Equal Treatment Policies 
 
Another type of policy designed to reduce the gap between FT and PT workers are ‘equal 
treatment policies’ that require employers to treat PT and FT workers equally.  In the UK the 
Part-time Workers Regulations that were introduced in 2000 aimed to ensure that “part-timers 
are not treated less favourably than comparable full-timers in their terms and conditions, 
unless it is objectively justified”   
 
But, as the pay gap between FT and PT women in the same occupation seems to have been 
small even before 2000 (see Table 5.1), ‘equal treatment’ legislation is unlikely to have much 
impact on the PT pay penalty.  Indeed the evidence on the evolution of the PTPP presented in 
Figure 1.1 suggests this has been the case.  And Figures 8.2 and 8.3 suggests these 
regulations have had little impact on the difference in holiday entitlement between PT and FT 
women even though the Working Time Directive had a large effect.  It seems that there are 
relatively small differences in treatment of PT and FT workers within jobs currently in the 
UK and the problem is that the jobs done by PT and FT women are very different. 
 
Training Subsidies 
 
Among the policy recommendations of the The Kingsmill Commission into the labour market 
position of women (Kingsmill, 2001) was a subsidy for the training of low-paid workers.  As 
PT women are more likely to be low-paid more PT than FT women would be the 
beneficiaries of such a policy so it would be expected to reduce the PTPP.  But, how much 
difference would it make?  Table 8.1 presents the gap in training receipt for FT and PT 
workers.  The first column shows that 9% of FT women have received job-related training or 
education in the past week, 18% in the last four weeks and 35% in the past 13 weeks.  The 
second column shows the unadjusted training differential between PT and FT women – so, 
for example, PT women are 10 percentage points less likely to have received training in the 
last 13 weeks.  But, if one adjusts this PT training penalty for differences in characteristics as 
is done in the second column (that excludes occupation) and in the third column (that 
includes occupation) then the adjusted training gap is only half the size of the unadjusted gap.  
And, as the fourth row of Table 8.1 shows, the actual differences in the amounts of training 
received are so small (or the order of 5 minutes a week) that there would have to be an 
implausibly large return to this training for a reduction in inequalities in training (whether by 
subsidising the training of low-paid workers who are more likely to be PT or by more direct 
means of targeting PT workers) to have much of an impact on the PTPP.  
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Rights to Flexible Working 
 
We have seen that one of the main problems facing women who want to work FT is that the 
better jobs do not seem to be available on a PT basis and that women making the transition 
from FT to PT work often have to change jobs to do so and suffer a downward occupational 
move.  Given that the desire to work PT is often associated with the desire to spend more 
time with children this forces many women to choose between career and family.  There have 
been some policy initiatives designed to strengthen the control of parents over their working 
hours.  From 6 April 2003, parents of children aged under six or disabled children aged under 
18 have the right to apply to work flexibly and their employers have a duty to consider these 
requests seriously.  Flexible working is wider than just a change in the number of hours as it 
often involves a rearrangement of hours but it is certainly meant to include some change of 
hours status and evidence (e.g. Palmer, 2004) suggests that the desire to change from FT to 
PT work is the most common type of request.  Some evidence suggests a large take-up by 
eligible women of these new rights.  For example, DTI (2004) reports that 40% of parents 
had made a request, 60% had had them agreed and 63% of employers had had at least one 
request.  It did report that women in senior positions were more likely to have their requests 
refused.  However, as the report itself admits, the sample on which this report is based is 
highly selective. And Palmer (2004) reports, using data from the first DTI flexible working 
employee survey (that has a more representative sample), that 16% of women had made a 
request to work flexibly since April 2003 and 86% of these requests had been fully or partly 
accepted by employers.  It also reports a significant increase in the number of requests being 
approved.  
 
Given this it is of interest to look at other data sets to see whether there is any evidence of 
change and this is possible as the LFS has, since 2001, contained information on various 
forms of flexible working.  As the earliest data available relates to March 2001 and the latest 
available data is for February 2004 it is possible that there were significant changes in 
practice prior to April 2003 (so the timing of the impact is different from the timing of the 
introduction of formal rights) and we are unable to undertake an assessment of anything other 
than the impact effect - it is of course possible that the long-run effect is very different.  
 
As the changes affect women with children aged less than 6 we distinguish this group from 
other women in the Figures that follow.  The legislation also affects women with disabled 
children of all ages but the numbers of these is relatively small and we have no way in our 
data to identify disabled children.  Figure 8.4 shows that there has been very little change in 
the proportion of women working PT over the period 2000 to 2004 so there is no evidence 
here of any very large shift from FT to PT work in April 2003 which is the time of the 
introduction of the legislation.  Furthermore Figure 8.5 also suggests a very considerable 
degree of stability in the proportions of women who want fewer and more hours in this 
period.  There is no evidence of any greater degree of concordance between aspiration and 
reality here.  Figure 8.6 looks at evidence that more women are asking employers for hours 
reductions and the fraction of employers who are able to agree to this.  Again, there is no 
evidence of dramatic change here.  It should be noted that these questions are only asked of 
women who want fewer hours so would not be asked of women who had successfully applied 
for an hours reduction – however as Figures 8.4 and 8.5 showed there is no evidence of big 
change in the fraction of women satisfied with their hours. 
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Of course flexible working is wider than just the number of hours so Figures 8.7a and 8.7b 
present evidence on the incidence of the most common forms of flexible working.  Once 
again there is little evidence of marked change after the introduction of the new regulations. 
 
There are a number of possible interpretations of why the LFS data shows virtually no impact 
of the legislation when other surveys show a more dramatic impact.  It could be that the true 
impact occurs prior to our earliest data in 2001 as employers changed practice in advance of 
the new rights coming into force, that few women have yet taken advantage of their new 
rights, that employers are finding ways of turning down requests, that these new rights are not 
perceived of being of value to many women, that women may be afraid to ask their employer 
for changes to their working hours or think it pointless if they know the request is going to be 
turned down.  Intriguingly, Woodland et al (2003, p116) report that “the characteristics of the 
workplaces that has received such a request [to move from FT to PT work] match those of the 
workplaces that reported such requests were acceptable”.  The evidence of limited impact 
does suggest that stronger legislation may be needed in order to give women true flexibility 
in the hours that they work. 
 
The British experience with rights to flexible working does not seem to be unique.  The 
Netherlands introduced similar legislation in 2000 probably in a slightly stronger form than in 
the UK i.e. with employers having fewer legitimate grounds for refusal.  But the study of 
Fouarge and Baaijens (2004) also suggests little impact on transition rates between FT and 
PT work. 
 
The Long Hours Culture 
 
One should also mention that policies that affect groups who are not PT workers could also 
have an impact on the welfare of those working PT.  For example, Britain stands out in the 
EU as the country in which FT workers have the longest weekly hours.  This is particularly 
marked among managers – according to the 2002 Eurostat Labour Force Survey the average 
hours worked by UK FT male managers are 47.5 a week, the highest in the EU (only 
Denmark has an average above 45 hours and countries like the Netherlands have an average 
of 39.7).  The UK is a country in which employers expect large commitments of time from 
their managers and this may serve to make PT managers look relatively unappealing.  But the 
experience of other countries suggests that there is no very good reason why managers have 
to work such long hours and a reduction in these working hours may also be an effective way 
to make PT workers in good jobs look to be relatively less unattractive to employers.  
 
Conclusions 
 
In this section we have discussed the impact of various policies that have been introduced in 
recent years that might have been expected to have an impact on the PTPP as well as one 
proposal (subsidising the training of low-paid workers) that has been proposed.  Minimum 
standards policies like the NMW are likely to have more impact than equal treatment policies 
as there does not seem widespread unequal treatment of FT and PT workers within jobs.  
However the impact of the NMW itself has been somewhat muted because it has been set at a 
modest level.  But, as occupational segregation is the main causes of the PTPP policies that 
directly target this are likely to be most effective.  In particular strengthening the rights of 
workers to change their hours status while keeping their pre-existing job seems a promising 
direction in which to move.  The existing rights to request flexible working do not seem, as 
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yet, to have had much of an impact: it is important to determine whether this is because they 
have not existed for long or because employers are not sympathetic to such requests.   
 
 
9. Conclusions 
 
On average women working PT in the UK have hourly earnings that are 22% less than 
women working FT – this is the PTPP.  The PTPP has widened over the past 30 years with 
most of the deterioration occurring prior to the mid-1990s.  But this cannot be used as an 
estimate of the pay penalty that would be suffered by a woman switching from FT to PT 
work as women working PT and women working PT are very different in their characteristics 
and do very different jobs.  Taking account of these differences the part-time penalty for 
identical women doing the same job is estimated to be about 10% if one does not control for 
occupation and about 3% if one does.  Hence, it is the difference in the occupations of PT and 
FT women that can explain most of the pay differentials between them.  The importance of 
occupation has increased over time as PT women have failed to make the occupational up-
grades seen for FT women over the past 30 years.  It is also the case that rising UK wage 
inequality has also acted to widen the pay gap between PT and FT women.  There does seem 
to be a problem in the fact that women who want to move from FT to PT work are often 
forced to change employer and/or occupation and, on average, make a downward 
occupational move.  This seems to occur even when they have the necessary skills and 
experience to do the higher-level job.  The consequence is that there are many women 
working PT who do not seem to be making full use of the skills that they have.  
 
Other EU countries have similar problems to the UK but the UK has the highest PTPP and 
one of the worst problems in enabling women to move between FT and PT work without 
losing status.  However British women working PT seem relatively satisfied with their jobs 
and do not report high levels of under-utilization of skills. 
  
Policy initiatives in recent years like the National Minimum Wage (1999), the Part-Time 
Workers Regulations (2000) and the Right to Request Flexible Working (2003) appear to 
have made little difference to the part-time pay penalty.  The most likely explanation of this 
is that, with the exception of the right to request flexible working, none of these policies are 
targeted on the routes by which PT women end up in low-level occupations.  And the right to 
request flexible working is quite weak in that it allows employers many legitimate reasons for 
refusing requests.  But it seems likely that more moves in this direction are likely to be the 
most effective way to breaking down barriers to the availability of high-level jobs on a PT 
basis that is the most likely way to reduce the PTPP. 
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Appendix A 
Multivariate Analysis of the Determinants of Part-Time Working 
 
In the main text of this report, section 3 is about ‘what types of women work part-time?’.  All 
of the tables and figures in that section are essentially bivariate reporting the correlation of 
PT working with certain characteristics but no more than one or two at a time.  There is a 
danger that conclusions based on this type of analysis are misleading because of correlations 
between different characteristics.  For example one might see a spurious correlation between 
PT working and education even if no true one exists but there is a correlation between PT 
working and having children and more educated women have fewer children.  The simplest 
way to allay these fears is to estimate a multivariate model in which one can control for many 
characteristics simultaneously. 
 
Means of variables for FT and PT working women are reported in Table A1. 
 
Accordingly Table A2 reports the estimates from a probit model in which the dependent 
variable is a binary variable taking the value 1 if the woman works PT and zero otherwise. 
The reference category is a white woman, aged 35-39 with ‘A’ levels who is single without 
children, who lives in the South-East, has job tenure between 5 and 10 years, is in the private 
sector in a permanent job in a workplace with less than 25 workers in retail and distribution 
and working in administration.  The predicted probability of such a woman working PT is 
29%.   
 
The reported coefficients are the marginal effects so can be interpreted as the change in the 
probability of working part-time from the base category when one changes the relevant 
characteristic.  So the marginal effect of -0.172 on the dummy variable for being aged 16-19 
means that a teenager is 17% less likely to work PT than a woman in the reference category. 
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Technical Appendix 
 
The estimates of the PTPP presented in the main body of this report are all based on a strong 
assumption - that PT status is exogenous (conditional on the included covariates).  Other 
papers in this literature assume it is not and pay a lot of attention in trying to provide more 
sophisticated estimates.  We have used our simpler approach because it is not really clear (in 
the absence of fantastic data) that more complicated methodologies solve the problems they 
identify and because the end results suggest a small PTPP.  But the empirical methodology is 
particularly important if the estimates of the PTPP vary a lot according to the estimation 
strategy used.  For example, using US data, Blank (1990) reports a very negative PTPP in the 
raw data, that becomes enormously negative when she uses instrumental variables as the 
estimation method and very positive when she uses a sample selectivity correction.  At the 
end of the paper one is not sure quite what to think.    
 
Econometric Methodology 
 
Here we discuss different approaches to the estimation of the PTPP.  We would like to be 
able to estimate the ‘causal’ effect of PT status i.e. the pay penalty that would be suffered by 
a woman who currently works changing from FT to PT status.  Even this definition of the 
PTPP is not always the aim of researchers.  Sometimes the aim is to estimate the PTPP for all 
women, whether they are currently working or not.  As women who work are not a random 
selection of all women one has to then model the selection of women into employment.  By 
choosing to focus on the estimation of the PTPP for women who currently work we avoid the 
need to do this.  In what follows, everything is conditional on a woman working.     
 
Define by Fiw  the log hourly wage of woman i if she works FT and by 
P
iw  the log hourly 
wage of woman i if she works PT.  Hence, for woman i we have that F Pi i iPTPP w w= − .  The 
problem is that, at any moment in time, the woman is at most observed in one of the states, 
FT or PT (it could be neither if the woman is not working at that time), so that one of the 
wages is missing and one cannot directly compute the PTPP.  One has to have some way to 
estimate the ‘missing’ wage observation(s).  One cannot do this without making some 
identifying assumptions and different methodologies make different assumptions. 
 
It is perhaps easiest to start with what is the most common situation where we are interested 
in the estimating the mean PTPP.  For a woman with characteristics ix  define the mean PTPP 
to be: 
 ( ) ( ) ( )F Pi i i i iPTPP x E w x E w x= −  (A1) 
Note that it is not possible to estimate individual-specific treatment effects – only averages 
across some groups.  However, neither of the expectations on the right-hand side of  (A1) are 
observable as we only observe the FT wage for women who work FT and the PT wage for 
women who work PT.  If we define a variable iPT  that takes the value 1 if woman I works 
PT and 0 if they work FT then what we observe is ( ), 0Fi i iE w x PT =  and ( ), 1Pi i iE w x PT = .  
A naïve estimator of the PTPP would use the simple gap between these two means.  So, let us 
define ( )n iPTPP x  to be:  
 ( ) ( ) ( ), 0 , 0n F Pi i i i i i iPTPP x E w x PT E w x PT= = − =     (A2)    
When is this naïve estimator equal to the true one?  Combining (A1) and (A2) we can derive:  
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( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ), 0 , 0n F F P Pi i i i i i i i i i i iPTPP x PTPP x E w x E w x PT E w x E w x PT⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤= + − = − − =⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
(A3)    
(A3) implies that a sufficient condition for the naïve estimate of the PTPP to be equal to the 
true PTPP is if the two terms in square brackets are equal to zero.  Now we can write the 
mean FT wage conditional on x as::  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )Pr 1 , 1 1 1 , 0F F Fi i i i i i i i i i i iE w x PT x E w x PT PT x E w x PT⎡ ⎤= = = + − = =⎣ ⎦  (A4) 
where ( )Pr 1i iPT x=  is the probability of an individual with characteristics x working PT.  
Using (A4) the first term in square brackets in (A3) can be written as: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ), 0 Pr 1 , 1 , 0F F F Fi i i i i i i i i i i i iE w x E w x PT PT x E w x PT E w x PT⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤− = = = = − =⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ (A5)     
This will only be equal to zero if:  ( ) ( ), 1 , 0F Fi i i i i iE w x PT E w x PT= = =    (A6)     
i.e. if the mean of FT log wages conditional on x is independent of whether an individual 
works FT or PT.  Similarly the term in the second square bracket in (A3) will be zero if:  ( ) ( ), 1 , 0P Pi i i i i iE w x PT E w x PT= = =    (A7) 
i.e. if the mean of FT log wages conditional on x is independent of whether an individual 
works FT or PT. 
 
The conditions in (A6) and (A7) have many different names in economics and statistics.  
Written in the form of  (A6) and (A7) one would say that, conditional on x, part-time status is 
ignorable.  Economists might be more familiar with saying that part-time status is exogenous.  
As it is an assumption that, conditional on observable characteristics (x), PT status is 
uncorrelated with unobservable characteristics, one can also express it as saying there is no 
problem with sample selection bias. 
 
The consequence of these conditions is that one can simply estimate the mean of the full-time 
log wage using only those who work FT and one can simply estimate the mean of the part-
time log wage using only those who work PT.  The PTPP is then simply computed as the 
difference between the two. 
 
We have presented 3 different estimates of the PTPP based on the exogeneity assumption, the 
dummy variable method, the Oaxaca decomposition and the re-weighting method.  Let us 
consider these in turn.  These make progressively weaker assumptions about the determinants 
of wages but, as in all statistical procedures, one’s estimates will have more precision if one 
imposes valid restrictions on the data, so that standard errors will also rise. 
 
Constant PTPP (Dummy Variable Method) 
If the PTPP does not vary across individuals then we will have that: ( ) ( )P Fi i i iE w x E w x α= +      (A8) 
where α  is the PTPP.  The simplest way to estimate this is to then model the mean of log 
wages conditional on characteristics x.  The simplest way to do this is assume the mean is 
linear in the characteristics, i.e. that we have:  ( )Fi i iE w x xβ=      (A9) 
The simplest way to estimate the PTPP in this case is to include all workers, both FT and PT 
in the same regression together with a dummy variable for whether the individual works PT.  
That is, to estimate the regression:  
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i i i iw PT xα β ε= + +       (A10) 
In this case the PTTP is simply given by α and is the same for everybody – part-time status is 
assumed to affect the intercept but not the slope coefficients.  If the assumption of a constant 
PTPP is incorrect but one estimates the model (A10) then the estimated PTPP will be some 
average of the PTPP across individuals in the sample – so will not be completely 
uninformative.  But, in such a circumstance it would obviously be better to try to model the 
variation in the PTPP.   
 
Varying PTPP (Oaxaca Decomposition) 
The assumption in (A8) and (A9) that the PTPP is the same for everyone is very strong and 
unlikely to be satisfied in practice.  A generalisation is to maintain the assumption that the 
means of the log wages are linear in the characteristics but to allow the slope coefficients as 
well as the intercept to differ according to whether a woman works FT or PT.  In this case, 
(A8) and (A9) can be generalised to:  ( )F Fi i iE w x xβ=       (A11) 
and:  ( )P Pi i iE w x xβ=       (A12) 
so that the PTPP for someone with characteristics x is given by:  
( ) ( )F Pi iPTPP x xβ β= −       (A13) 
Under the exogeneity assumption (A11) and (A12) can be simple estimated using OLS.   
Because the average PTPP now varies with the characteristics so will be different for every 
woman and it is impossible to list the estimate for everybody, it is conventional to report the 
PTPP for a representative worker, either the average FT worker or the PT worker.  Although 
this is really nothing more than a convention, one justification for the procedure is the Oaxaca 
decompostion.  Because regression estimates go through the mean we will have:  ( ) ( )ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆF P F F P P F P F P F Pw w x x x x xβ β β β β− = − = − + −     (A14) 
so that overall observed wage gap between FT and PT workers can be decomposed into a 
component that is the PTPP for the average FT worker and a part that is the difference in 
earnings between the average FT and PT worker using the coefficients from the PT equation.  
This decomposition is not unique – one can also write: ( ) ( )ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆF P F F P P F P P F F Pw w x x x x xβ β β β β− = − = − + −     (A15) 
which decomposes the overall observed wage gap between FT and PT workers into a 
component that is the PTPP for the average PT worker and a part that is the difference in 
earnings between the average FT and PT worker using the coefficients from the FT equation.   
 
Because this method allows the PTPP to vary with the characteristics, it is not possible to 
estimate the PTPP if there are some x variables that are perfectly collinear with the PT 
dummy and there may a problem of large standard errors if there is high but not perfect 
collinearity.  This may be a problem particularly when one includes detailed industrial and 
occupational controls.  For example, in our sample of 85194 individuals in the LFS there are 
248 for whom they have a value of x that cannot be observed in the other group.  To make 
this a bit more real the largest excluded group is 87 school crossing patrol attendants all of 
whom are part-time.  As we observe no such workers working full-time we cannot estimate 
the coefficient on the dummy variable for this occupation in the FT equation.  But as less than 
one-third of one-per cent of all observations are excluded this has very little substantive 
impact on the results. 
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Varying PTPP (The Reweighting Method) 
 
The Oaxaca decomposition assumes that the mean of the log wage is linear in the x variables.  
The re-weighting method makes weaker assumptions.  Suppose the distribution of log wages 
with characteristics x who work FT is given by ( )Ff w x , that the distribution of log wages 
with characteristics x who work PT is given by ( )Pf w x .  The PTPP in the mean of log 
wages for a woman with characteristics x can then be written as: 
 ( ) ( ) ( )F PPTPP x w f w x f w x dw⎡ ⎤= −⎣ ⎦∫  (A16) 
As in the previous example this varies with x so, in the interests of economy one typically 
reports averages across different groups.  We choose to report estimates across the FT 
workers and the PT workers.  The average across the FT workers will be given by:  
 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
F P F
F F P F
PTPP w f w x f w x g x dw
wf w x g x dw wf w x g x dw
⎡ ⎤= −⎣ ⎦
= −
∫∫
∫∫ ∫∫  (A17) 
where the distribution of x among FT workers is ( )Fg x .  Similarly one could estimate the 
average across the PT workers that will be given by:  
 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
F P P
F P P P
PTPP w f w x f w x g x dw
wf w x g x dw wf w x g x dw
⎡ ⎤= −⎣ ⎦
= −
∫∫
∫∫ ∫∫    (A18) 
where ( )Pg x  is the distribution of x among PT workers.  Note that the only difference 
between (A17) and (A18) is in the distribution of x used to average the PTPP. 
 
Now let us consider how one can estimate (A17).  One way of writing the assumption about 
the exogeneity of PT status is that: 
 ( ) ( ), 0F Ff w x f w x PT= =  (A19) 
so that the first term on the second line of (A17) can be written as:  
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ), 0F F F F Fwf w x g x dw wf w x PT g x dw w= = =∫∫ ∫∫   (A20) 
i.e the observed mean log wage among the women who work FT.  Now consider the second 
term on the second line of (A17).  The assumption on the exogeneity of PT status implies 
that:   
 ( ) ( ), 1P Pf w x f w x PT= =  (A21) 
so that the second term on the second line of (A17) can be written as:  
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ), 1P F P Fwf w x g x dw wf w x PT g x dw= =∫∫ ∫∫    (A22) 
but note that the final term is not the observed mean log wage among PT workers as it is 
evaluated at the distribution of x among FT and not PT workers.  But we can re-weight the 
observed PT workers to ensure that the re-weighted distribution of x is the same as for FT 
workers.  The weights that are necessary to do this are: 
 ( )( )( )
F
P
g x
p x
g x
=  (A23) 
 
To estimate these weights we follow the method used by diNardo, Fortin and Lemieux 
(1996).  They observed that application of Bayes’ Rule implies that: 
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 ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
Pr 1
Pr 1
Pr 1 Pr 0
P
P F
g x PT
PT x
g x PT g x PT
== = = + =  (A24) 
 and that:  
 ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
Pr 0
Pr 0
Pr 1 Pr 0
F
P F
g x PT
PT x
g x PT g x PT
== = = + =  (A25) 
Re-arranging (A24) and (A25) we can derive: 
 
 ( )( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
Pr 0 Pr 1 1 Pr 1 Pr 1
.
1 Pr 1Pr 1 Pr 0 Pr 1
F
P
PT x PT PT xg x PT
g x PTPT x PT PT x
= = − = == = − == = =  (A26) 
 
which are the weights required.  The terms on the right-hand side of (A26) can be derives 
from an estimate of the probability of working PT given characteristics.  The particular model 
we use is the probit model described in Appendix A. 
 
To work out (A18) one simply needs to re-weight the FT workers using the inverse of the 
weights in (A26).  Note that the weights will not be defined if there are any values of x for 
which everyone or no-one is PT.  This is the equivalent of the identification for the Oaxaca 
decomposition.  And, there may be very large standard errors if the proportion PT is close to 
zero or one as the weights may then be very large making the estimates very sensitive to 
observed wages among those groups.  For this reason one often reports estimates based on a 
more balanced sample in which the weights are trimmed. 
 
The re-weighting methodology makes much less in the way of assumptions about the 
distribution of wages.  But there is typically a price to be paid for this flexibility: the 
necessity to make some assumption about the functional form of the relationship between the 
probability of working PT and x.  So, while it is sometimes claimed that this method is  ‘less 
parametric’ and so less restrictive than something like the Oaxaca decomposition it typically 
substitutes one form of parameterization for another and is not obviously better. 
   
It should also be noted that there are other ways of estimating the PTPP – see Imbens (2003) 
for a review. 
 
One of the advantages of the re-weighting approach is that one can use to compute statistics 
other than the mean.  Once one has the re-weighted distribution one can compute medians 
and deciles, variances or anything else one wants.  This is the basis of the calculations in 
Table 4.6.  Some care is needed in interpreting these: because one cannot identify individual-
specific PTPPs one cannot work out the distribution of the individual-specific PTPPs.  But 
one can compare the overall distribution of earnings among FT women and what the 
distribution of the earnings would be among equivalent women if they worked PT.  
 
Table B1 reports the estimates of the PTPP for the UK LFS using the three methodologies 
described here.  In table B1 they are reported in log points – these are then converted to 
percentage point differences for the presentation in Table 4.1 in the main body of the report.  
Table B2 reports estimates from the ECHPS that form the basis of Table 7.8 in the main body 
of the text. 
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The Exogeneity Assumption 
 
However, all the methodologies described above are based on the assumption that PT status 
is exogenous.  But it is important to realize that this is a very strong assumption, one that 
might not be satisfied in practice.  To understand how strong it is suppose that the way in 
which FT and PT log wages are determined is given by:  
F F F
i i iw xβ ε= +       (A27) 
and:  
P P P
i i iw xβ ε= +       (A28) 
where ( ),F Pi iε ε  are assumed to have mean zero and be independent of the characteristics ix .  
With this set-up the PTPP for woman i is given by:  ( ) ( )F P F Pi i i iPTPP xβ β ε ε= − + −       (A29) 
One interpretation of (A29) is that the PTPP is made up of an observable component related 
to the characteristics ix  and an unobservable component related to ( ),F Pi iε ε .  The exogeneity 
assumption allows PT status to be correlated with ix  (indeed this is something that can be 
tested) but assumes that it is uncorrelated with the unobserved component.  Quite rightly, this 
strikes many researchers as somewhat implausible as, if PT status is chosen by women for 
whom the PTPP is relatively small this will lead to a correlation between the error in (A29) 
and PT status.  All the estimates presented in the previous section will then be inconsistent.  
 
What are the specific reasons why we might expect exogeneity to fail?  We will discuss three 
though one could almost certainly come up with others. 
 
First, individuals might differ in their commitment to the world of paid work and their 
ambitions in it.  It seems plausible that those who are ambitious make greater investments in 
human capital that have a bigger pay-off in FT work so that the PTPP is negatively correlated 
with whether individuals work PT.   
 
Secondly, there is the ‘labour supply curve’ argument.  There is a very large literature that 
considers the impact of wages on hours of work.  In contrast we have considered the impact 
of hours of work (specifically whether an individual is part-time or not) on wages.  There is 
an obvious danger of reverse causation here: maybe it is low wages that ‘cause’ PT work, not 
PT work that ‘causes’ low wages.  It should be noted that the existence of a PTPP might also 
cause problems for labour supply models (see Moffitt, 1984, and Lundberg, 1985, for studies 
that find evidence of a link between hours and hourly wages that is similar to a PTPP).   
 
Thirdly, if PT status is defined using an hours-based measure and hourly wages are computed 
by dividing a measure of weekly earnings by a measure of weekly hours (as is the case in the 
LFS, the NES and the ECHPS) then any measurement error in hours will result in a failure of 
exogeneity and a bias in the estimates of the PTPP.  To given an extreme example (though 
one that does occur very occasionally) suppose a decimal point was accidentally inserted in 
recording weekly hours and an individual was recorded as working 4 hours per week instead 
of 40.  Their computed hourly wage would be 10 times the real level.  This bias will tend to 
lead to an underestimate of the PTPP.      
 
If exogeneity fails, how can we get a consistent estimate of the PTPP?  There are a number of 
possible directions in which we might go. 
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Fixed Effect Estimates 
 
First, by including better data one might hope to reduce the problem.  If one has multiple 
observations on individuals i.e. panel data then one way in which one could do this would be 
to use fixed effect estimates – effectively introduce a dummy variable for each individual.  
The estimate of the PTPP then comes from data on those workers who are sometimes 
observed working FT and sometimes PT and compares their wages in these two situations. 
 
In the LFS we do have a limited panel component as earnings information is recorded in both 
waves 1 and 5.  Table B3 investigates panel estimates of the PTPP.  In the first column we 
report estimates of the PTPP using the ‘constant PTPP’ methodology but restricting the 
sample to those women with two wage observations (there is a sample selection issue here as 
we will under-sample women with weak labour market attachment).  The PTPP is similar at 
4.8% though slightly larger than the estimates in Table 4.1.  In the second column we include 
fixed-effects - the coefficient on PT status is now positive not negative implying the existence 
of a part-time pay premium of 5.2% and not a pay penalty. 
 
It is perhaps tempting to think that this fixed effect estimate is the best estimate of the PTPP.  
But, there is reason to think that there are problems with it.  One is the division bias problem 
reported above – any measurement error in hours will tend to be magnified in panel data and 
the division bias problem will become larger (see Freeman 1984).  On the face of it this 
should not be a problem in the LFS data as the PT status definition is based on self-
assessment so should not be affected by any measurement error in hours.  But there is reason 
to believe that there is a problem. 
 
Since March 1999, there has also been a direct question in the LFS about the hourly rate of 
pay.  This is only defined for those who are paid by the hour, which is approximately 40% of 
employees.  The important point is that this earnings measure should be less affected by 
measurement error in earnings as hours information is not used to derive the hourly wage 
measure.  The third column of Table B3 reports OLS estimates of the PTPP using the hourly 
pay measure as the dependent variable but restricting the sample to those workers for whom 
we have two observations on both the hourly pay and hourly rate measures.  This coefficient 
is essentially zero.  The fourth column then reports fixed effect estimates using the hourly pay 
measure – this suggests a large pay premium to PT work.  But, when one uses the hourly rate 
measures as the dependent variable one gets a PTPP of 3.1% using OLS and 1.9% using fixed 
effects.  That is, a PTPP remains even with the fixed effect estimates and there is less 
difference between the OLS and fixed effect results.  It seems reasonable to think that the 
hourly rate estimates are the more reasonable and these are closer to the estimates that do not 
use fixed-effects. 
 
Table B4 reports fixed effect estimates of the PTPP using the ECHPS data.  The resulting 
coefficients on the part-time dummy are in most cases positive, and everywhere higher than 
those reported in Table 7.8. One the one hand it may be argued that the estimated PTPP is 
lower (and indeed becomes a premium) when including fixed-effects if workers with low-
wage characteristics tend to be over-represented in PT jobs.  On the other hand, the inclusion 
of fixed-effects may amplify the effect of measurement error in reported hours status, which 
makes one doubt about the reliability of the estimated PT pay premia in Table B4. 
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Sample Selection Corrections 
 
If, after one has made all possible attempts to deal with the exogeneity problem by the use of 
better data, it still remains, what can then be done?  Crudely there are two techniques, 
instrumental variables (IV) and control function (CF) (or sample selection corrections) – see 
Heckman and Navarro-Lozano (2003) for a survey.  Suppose that the following model 
describes whether a woman works FT or PT conditional on them working at all: 
( )0i i iPT I zγ η= + >       (A30) 
where ( ).I  is an indicator function.  The variables, z, that affect whether a woman works FT 
or PT might be the same or different from those which directly affect wages.  In fact to work 
well, both IV and CF estimates require some variable in z that does not affect the wage 
equations in (A27) and (A28) but does affect whether an individual works PT.  Such a 
variable is difficult to find and this is why this approach is not reported in the main text.  But 
to illustrate the difference the use of this methodology makes we will follow most of the 
papers in the literature (e.g. Ermisch and Wright, 1993; Blank, 1990) and assume that 
children and marital status affect the decision to work PT but not the wages earned.  This is a 
very strong assumption that may not, in reality, be any better than the exogeneity assumption 
that this is supposed to replace. 
 
Here we report the CF estimates.  If we estimate a wage equation for FT workers then one 
estimates the conditional mean i.e. one estimates:  ( ) ( )
( )
, , 0 , , 0
, ,
F F F
i i i i i i i i i
F F
i i i i i i
E w x z PT x E x z PT
x E x z z
β ε
β ε η γ
= = + =
= + < −      
 (A31) 
and, if one estimates a wage equation for PT workers then one will estimate: ( ) ( )
( )
, , 1 , , 1
, ,
P P P
i i i i i i i i i
P P
i i i i i i
E w x z PT x E x z PT
x E x z z
β ε
β ε η γ
= = + =
= + ≥ −      
 (A32) 
The PTPP for workers with characteristics x is given by ( )P F xβ β− . 
 
Table B5 reports estimates of the PTPP that use this methodology.  They are very similar to 
those using simpler approaches. 
 
Our conclusion is that, while PT status is likely to be endogenous, it is hard to propose an 
estimation procedure that is clearly much better and that the best estimates available do not 
provide any evidence against the conclusion that the PTPP in the UK is, once one controls for 
occupation, between zero and 5%.  For the EU countries, one should perhaps be a little more 
circumspect.  The estimates of the PTPP obtained from the ECHPS do differ somewhat from 
those obtained in studies of individual countries (e.g. the UK) and there are some question 
marks about the quality of the data.  
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Table 2.1 
Comparison of Different Definitions of PT status. 
 
Definition based on Basic Usual Hours  
Full-Time Part-Time Total 
Full-Time 6.6 
(52.7) 
0.5 
(3.8) 
7.1 
(56.5) 
Part-Time 0.2 
(1.4) 
5.3 
(42.0) 
5.4 
(43.5) 
 
Self-Assessed 
Total 6.8 
(54.1) 
5.8 
(45.9) 
12.5 
(100.0) 
 
Notes: 
1. Source, LFS March 2003- February 2004.  All numbers are weighted. 
2. Definition of FT based on hours measure using >30 for most workers but >25 for 
teachers.  Figures relate to main jobs only. 
3. First number is number of workers in millions. Percentage of total is in brackets. 
 
Table 3.1 
Reasons for taking PT Job 
 
% All PT Workers Non-Students Students 
Student 12 3 98 
Ill/Disabled 2 2 0 
Found No FT Job 6 6 1 
Did Not Want FT Job 80 89 1 
 
Notes: 
1. Source, LFS March 2003- February 2004.  All percentages are weighted.  Sample 
is women working PT in main job.  Total number of observations is 48700. 
2. Students are defined as those still in full-time education.  This explains why some 
non-students report they are working PT because they are a ‘student’. 
 
Table 3.2 
Reasons for not Wanting FT Job (Non-students) 
 
 
Reason Given Percentage 
Financially secure - work because want to 7 
Earn enough working part-time 7 
Want to spend more time with family 41 
Domestic commitments prevent full-time working 27 
Insufficient child-care facilities 2 
Other 16 
 
Notes: 
1. Source, LFS March 2003- February 2004.  All percentages are weighted. Sample 
is women working PT in main job who are not still in full-time education. 
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Table 3.3 
Ethnicity and PT Working 
 
 
Ethnicity % working 
PT 
% working Share of 
female 
employment 
White 42.0 69.6 93.8 
Mixed 32.9 65.8 0.6 
Indian 30.3 63.1 1.7 
Pakistani 40.1 26.2 0.4 
Bangladeshi 29.7 21.4 0.1 
Other Asian 30.7 55.1 0.5 
Black Caribbean 25.8 66.7 1.0 
Black African 25.0 55.5 0.8 
Other Black 26.0 67.5 0.1 
Chinese 28.6 60.3 0.3 
Other 34.6 47.2 0.7 
Notes. 
1. Source LFS March 2003- February 2004.  All percentages are weighted.  
2. Sample is women working who are not in full-time education and data refer to 
main job only. 
 
Table 3.4 
The Industrial Distribution of PT and FT Work 
 
 
% FT Women PT Women All Women 
Agriculture & fishing  0.5 0.6 0.6 
Energy & water  0.6 0.2 0.5 
Manufacturing  10.5 5.0 8.2 
Construction  1.7 1.7 1.7 
Distribution, hotels and restaurants  16.6 25.7 20.4 
Transport & communication 4.4 2.8 3.7 
Banking, finance and insurance  17.4 12.5 15.4 
Public admin, education and health  42.0 43.7 42.7 
Other services  6.2 7.7 6.8 
 
Notes. 
1. Source LFS March 2003- February 2004.  All percentages are weighted.  
2. Sample is women working who are not in full-time education and data refer to 
main job only. 
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Table 3.5 
The Incidence of Flexible Working Practices Among PT and FT Women 
 
 Part-Time Full-Time 
Works Flex-Time 9.4% 14.3% 
Annualised Hours Contract 4.3% 4.9% 
Term-Time Working Agreement 11.6% 5.3% 
Job Sharing 3.5% 0.2% 
Nine-Day Fortnight 0.0% 0.2% 
Four-and-a-Half Day Week 0.1% 1.1% 
Zero Hours Contract 0.8% 0.2% 
None of the Above 71.7% 74.3% 
 
Notes. 
1. Source LFS March 2003-May 2003 and December 2003-February 2004 (the 
relevant questions are only asked in spring and autumn quarters).  All percentages 
are weighted.  
2. Sample is women working who are not in full-time education and data refer to 
main job only. 
 
 
Table 3.6 
The Occupational Distribution of PT and FT Work 
 
 FT Women 
(%) 
PT Women 
(%) 
All Women 
(%) 
Managers and senior officials 15.1 4.4 10.7 
Professional occupations  13.8 7.8 11.3 
Associate professional and technical  17.3 11.3 14.8 
Administrative and  secretarial 23.3 22.4 23.0 
Skilled trades 2.1 1.9 2.0 
Personal services  12.4 16.6 14.1 
Sales and customer services  7.1 15.9 10.7 
Process, plant and machine operatives 3.2 1.8 2.6 
Elementary 5.4 17.9 10.6 
 
Notes. 
1. Source LFS March 2003- February 2004.  All percentages are weighted.  
2. Sample is women working who are not in full-time education and data refer to 
main job only. 
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Table 3.7 
The Most Common Occupations among PT and FT Women 
(% of Total Employment) 
 
Part-Time % Av 
Wage
Full-Time % Av 
Wage
Sales and retail assistants 10.1 4.86 general office assistants or clerk 4.3 6.82 
Cleaners, domestics 7.1 4.97 accnts wages clerk, bookkeeper 3.9 7.96 
Care assistants and home carers 5.0 5.70 Nurses 3.6 10.53
General office assistants or 
clerk  
4.2 6.82 Care assistants and home carers  3.3 5.70 
Educational assistants 3.4 5.98 sales and retail assistants  3.3 4.86 
Kitchen and catering assistants 3.4 4.77 personal assists & othr secretarie 3.2 8.32 
Nurses 3.4 10.53Prim & nurs eductn teaching profs 3.1 13.87
Accnts wages clerk, bookkeeper 3.1 7.96 secondary eductn teaching prfsnals 2.4 14.35
Retail cashiers/check-out 
operator 
2.8 4.86 Retail and wholesale managers  1.8 7.17 
Receptionists 2.8 6.08 Office managers 1.7 10.07
Personal assists & other 
secretaries 
2.6 8.32 customer care occupations  1.7 7.02 
Nursing auxiliaries and 
assistants 
1.8 5.60 local gov clerical offs & assists 1.6 7.59 
School mid-day assistants 1.8 5.11 civil serv admin offcrs and assist 1.6 7.32 
Counter clerks 1.8 6.93 Educational assistants 1.6 5.98 
Prim & nurs eductn teaching 
profs 
1.6 13.87 marketing and sales managers 1.6 14.58
Customer care occupations 1.5 7.02 Receptionists 1.4 6.08 
Bar staff 1.1 4.48 Nursing auxiliaries and assistants 1.3 5.60 
Local gov clerical offs & assists 1.1 7.59 Nursery nurses 1.3 6.54 
Waitresses 1.1 4.75 Counter clerks  1.1 6.93 
Hairdressers 1.1 4.08 Hairdressers 1.1 4.08 
Other Teaching Professionals 1.1 11.91Cleaners, domestics 1.1 4.97 
   Childminders 1.0 4.44 
 
Notes. 
1. Source LFS March 2003- February 2004.  All percentages are weighted.  
2. Sample is women working who are not in full-time education and data refer to main 
job only. 
3. Average wage is the geometric mean of the hourly wage for all women.  See Table 
4.5 for information on the PTPP within selected occupations. 
4. For information the median hourly wage for women is £8.85, the 25th percentile is 
£5.29 and the 75th percentile is £10.63.  
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Table 3.8 
The Occupations with the Highest and Lowest Proportions of PT Workers 
 
Most PT Intensive 
Occupations 
% PT Av Wage Least PT Intensive 
Occupations 
% 
PT 
Mean 
Hourly 
Wage 
school crossing patrol 
attendants 
100 5.29 managers in Construction 0.0 10.77 
school mid-day assistants 98.2 5.11 Quality assurance 
managers 
3.1 14.32 
cleaners, domestics 82.6 4.97 Transport and distribution 
managers 
4.3 10.61 
playgroup leaders & 
assistants 
82.6 5.14 Purchasing Managers 5.4 14.07 
shelf fillers 80.3 5.38 Police Officers (sergeant 
and below) 
7.6 11.63 
Collector salesperson 78.4 8.14 Environmental protection 
officers 
7.9 10.05 
retail cashiers/check-out 
operator 
75.2 4.86 Travel agency managers 9.4 8.83 
Bar staff 73.2 4.48 leisure and sports 
managers  
9.8 8.10 
kitchen and catering 
assistants 
70.5 4.77 Prison service officers 
(below principal officer) 
9.9 8.50 
Sports coaches 68.4 9.10 Marketing and sales 
managers 
10.0 14.58 
 
Notes. 
1. Source LFS March 2003- February 2004.  All percentages are weighted.  
2. Sample is women working who are not in full-time education and data refer to main 
job only.  
3. Average wage is the geometric mean of the hourly wage. 
4. Only occupations with total employment of more than 25000 are reported (using LFS 
grossing weights) and miscellaneous occupations are excluded.   
5. For information the median hourly wage for women is £8.85, the 25th percentile is 
£5.29 and the 75th percentile is £10.63.  
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Table 4.1 
Estimates of the PT Pay Penalty: Different Methodologies 
 
  Basic 
Controls 
Basic 
Controls+ 
broad 
occupation 
Basic 
Controls+ 
narrow 
occupation 
    
Unadjusted PTPP -22.1% -22.1% -22.1% 
     
Adjusted PTPP (Constant) -11.0% -3.3% -2.5% 
    
Adjusted PTPP (Varying) 
(Average PT Woman) 
-10.8% -3.1% -2.4% 
Adjusted PTPP (Varying) 
(Average FT Woman) 
-11.0% -3.4% -3.0% 
 
Notes: 
1. Data is from LFS 2001-2003. 
2. Basic controls are for year, month, region, education, experience (age), ethnicity, 
marital status, the number of children, the age of youngest child, job tenure, employer 
size and industry. 
3. More detail on these results can be found in Appendix B and Table B1.  
 
Table 4.2 
The Importance of Different Factors in Accounting for the PT Pay Penalty 
 
 FT Coefficients PT Coefficients 
Unadjusted PTPP -22.1% -22.1% 
PTPP Accounted for by 
Characteristics -20.2% -19.7% 
Of which the contribution of the following variables is: 
Year/Month 0.0% 0.0% 
Region 4.9% 4.5% 
Education 16.4% 11.8% 
Age -8.8% -3.6% 
Race -0.4% 0.0% 
Marital Status/ Children 3.1% -0.9% 
Job Tenure 1.8% 1.8% 
Employer Size 5.3% 3.6% 
Industry 9.3% 13.2% 
Occupation (Narrowly defined) 68.1% 70.0% 
 
Notes. 
1. These estimates come from the bottom half of Table 4.1. 
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Table 4.3 
The PT Pay Penalty in Workplace Employee Relations Survey 
 
 
  Basic 
Controls 
Basic Controls+ 
broad 
occupation 
Basic Controls 
+broad 
occupation 
+firm Effects 
     
Unadjusted PTPP -24.5% -24.5% -22.1% 
     
Adjusted PTPP (Constant) -11.9% -3.4% -2.5% 
Adjusted PTPP (Varying) 
(Average PT woman) -12.6% -4.9% -2.4% 
Adjusted PTPP (Varying) 
(Average FT woman) -9.9% -1.4% -3.0% 
 
Notes. 
1. Data source is 1998 Workplace Industrial Relations Survey. 
2. Basic Controls Included are education, age, ethnicity, marital status, the presence of 
children in the household, job tenure, employer size, industry and the extent of gender 
segregation in the job.  
 
 
Table 4.4 
The Variation in the PT Pay Penalty by education 
 
  No Quals GCSEs `A’ Level Graduates 
      
Unadjusted PTPP -17.1% -15.0% -15.5% -13.0% 
Basic Controls 
Adjusted PTPP (Constant) -9.6% -9.5% -10.2% -12.1% 
Adjusted PTPP (Varying) 
(Average PT woman) -8.8% -9.9% -10.7% -12.0% 
Adjusted PTPP (Varying) 
(Average FT woman) -11.0% -9.2% -11.1% -12.2% 
Basic Controls + broad occupation 
Adjusted PTPP (Constant) -2.1% -3.7% -3.4% -3.6% 
Adjusted PTPP (Varying) 
(Average PT woman) -0.4% -3.7% -4.3% -4.0% 
Adjusted PTPP (Varying) 
(Average FT woman) -5.1% -4.0% -3.0% -2.1% 
 
Notes. 
1. Estimation uses the same data and methods as Table 4.1 but estimates separate 
earnings equations for the four education groups. 
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Table 4.5 
Part-Time Pay Penalties in selected Occupations 
 
 Unadjusted 
PTPP 
Adjusted 
PTPP 
(Constant) 
Number of 
observations
primary & nursery education teaching profs  -1.4% -0.5% 2359 
nurses  +4.3%* -0.4% 3394 
civil service admin officers and assistants  +9.9%* +3.3% 1219 
local government clerical officers & assistants -5.2%* -5.3%* 1257 
accounts wages clerk, bookkeeper  -3.9%* -4.6%* 3107 
counter clerks  -4.9%* -4.7%* 1308 
filing & other records assistants & clerks  -5.5%* -3.8% 917 
general office assistants or clerk  0.0% -3.2%* 3529 
personal assistants & other secretaries  -11.4%* -4.8%* 2644 
receptionists  -1.6% -1.7% 1792 
nursing auxiliaries and assistants  +7.0%* +7.1%* 1427 
care assistants and home carers  +2.7%* +1.8% 3575 
educational assistants  -6.2%* -2.9% 2222 
sales and retail assistants  -3.5%* -1.5% 5323 
customer care occupations  -5.4%* -4.0%* 1410 
kitchen and catering assistants  -2.7% -2.5% 1937 
cleaners, domestics  +0.2% 0.0% 3388 
 
Notes 
1. Data is the same as that used in Table 4.1. 
2. Other controls included are year, month, region, education, experience (age), 
ethnicity, marital status, the number of children, the age of youngest child, job tenure, 
employer size and industry. 
3. An asterisk denotes that the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 10% 
level. 
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Table 4.6 
The PT Pay Penalty at Different Points in the Pay Distribution 
 
 Unadjusted 
PTPP 
Adjusted PTPP 
for Av FT 
Woman 
Adjusted PTPP 
for Av PT 
Woman 
10th Percentile -13.2% -8.2% -3.4% 
    
25th Percentile -19.1% -10.5% -5.8% 
    
50th Percentile -23.6% -7.5% -7.3% 
    
75th Percentile -23.4% -3.5% -3.8% 
    
90th Percentile -15.8% 4.1% -0.3% 
    
 
Notes. 
1. Data is the same as that used in Table 4.1. 
2. The estimation method and interpretation of results are described in more detail in 
Appendiz B.   
3. The estimates reported here are for the more balanced sample (details in Appendix 
B).   
 
Table 4.7 
The part-time pay penalty Using Different Definitions of PT Status 
 
 Self-Assessment Hours-Based Definition 
Unadjusted PTPP -22.1% -23.5% 
Adjusted PTPP (Constant) -2.5% -1.7% 
Adjusted PTPP (Varying) 
(Average PT Woman) 
-2.4% -1.9% 
Adjusted PTPP (Varying) 
 (Average FT Woman) 
-3.0% -1.9% 
 
Notes. 
1. The sample and estimation method are the same as for Table 4.1.  The Controls 
include narrowly defined occupation. 
2. For the hours-based definition of PT status a worker is defined as PT if their basic 
usual weekly hours are <30 with the exception of teachers who are defined as PT if 
their hours are <25. 
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Table 5.1 
A Comparison of the Detailed Decomposition in the 1990s and 2000s 
 
 1993/1995 2001/2003 
 FT Coefficients PT Coefficients FT Coefficients PT Coefficients 
Unadjusted PTPP -22.4% -22.4% -22.1% -22.1% 
Adjusted PTPP -1.1% -3.5% -1.9% -2.4% 
PTPP Gap 
Accounted for by 
Characteristics -21.3% -18.9% -20.2% -19.7% 
Of which the contribution of the following variables is: 
Year/Month 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Region 6.3% 5.2% 4.9% 4.5% 
Education 19.7% 13.3% 16.4% 11.8% 
Experience -10.5% -2.9% -8.8% -3.6% 
Race -0.4% 0.0% -0.4% 0.0% 
Marital Status/ 
Children 5.4% -1.4% 3.1% -0.9% 
Job Tenure 5.0% 4.8% 1.8% 1.8% 
Employer Size 8.8% 6.2% 5.3% 3.6% 
Industry 7.9% 7.6% 9.3% 13.2% 
Occupation (narrow) 57.3% 67.6% 68.1% 70.0% 
 
Notes. 
1. Estimates for 2001/3 are taken from Table 4.2.  Estimates for earlier period simply 
apply same methodology to data from that period. 
 
Table 5.2 
Changes in the Occupational Distribution of PT and FT Employment 
 
 Part-Time Full-time  
 1975 2001 Change 1975 2001 Change Change 
FT-
Change 
PT 
Managers  0.6% 3.8% 3.2% 4.5% 15.6% 11.1% 7.9% 
Professionals 2.6% 4.7% 2.1% 7.6% 12.9% 5.3% 3.2% 
Associate 
Professional 4.3% 9.3% 5.0% 7.5% 12.2% 4.7% -0.3% 
Clerical 24.0% 25.9% 1.9% 43.3% 33.2% -10.1% -12.0% 
Craft 4.2% 0.8% -3.4% 5.7% 2.1% -3.7% -0.3% 
Personal 
Service 11.0% 20.9% 9.8% 6.4% 9.4% 3.0% -6.9% 
Sales 13.1% 19.4% 6.3% 7.4% 6.7% -0.7% -7.0% 
Operatives 10.4% 2.1% -8.3% 11.7% 4.9% -6.8% 1.5% 
Others 29.8% 13.2% -16.6% 5.9% 3.1% -2.8% 13.9% 
 
Notes. 
1. Data is taken from New Earnings Survey. 
2 Occupational Coding is 1990 Standard Occupational Classification. 
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Table 6.1 
Previous Labour Market Status of FT and PT Workers 
 
Labour Market Status 3 
months ago 
Currently FT Currently PT 
   
% Full-Time 95.5 3.8 
% Part-Time 2.8 91.6 
% Previously 
Unemployed 
1.0 1.5 
Of which 
% Previous job FT 78.5 13.8 
% Previous job PT 6.1 69.2 
% Previous Job not known 15.4 17.0 
% Previously Inactive 0.9 4.2 
Of which 
% Previous job FT 86.8 4.3 
% Previous job PT 1.4 82.7 
% Previous Job not known 11.8 13.0 
 
Notes. 
1. Data is taken from quarterly LFS for the period June 2001 to February 2004. 
 
 
Table 6.2 
Changes in Hours, Jobs and Occupations 
 
 Currently FT Currently PT 
 Change in 
Hours 
Status 
No 
Change 
in 
Hours 
Status 
Change in 
Hours 
Status 
No 
Change 
in 
Hours 
Status 
% with a new employer 27.6 3.3 17.4 2.9 
% with a new employer 
 - changing narrow occupation 
77.8 50.4 73.2 47.7 
% with a new employer 
 - changing broad occupation 
61.1 34.6 57.4 33.4 
% with old employer 
 - changing narrow occupation 
14.0 6.7 12.2 4.5 
% with old employer 
 - changing broad occupation 
9.6 4.0 8.2 2.5 
 
Notes. 
1. Data is taken from quarterly LFS for the period June 2001 to February 2004. 
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Table 6.3 
Occupational Mobility 
 
 Dependent Variable Sample All Women Graduates 
1 Occupational wage All Currently in Work -13.8% -13.1% 
 Entrants from Non-Employment 
2 Occupational wage All Entrants -14.4% -14.6% 
3 Occupational wage 
change 
All Entrants  
-7.5% -17.1% 
4 Occupational wage 
change 
Entrants who were previously FT 
-9.9% -20.7% 
5 Occupational wage 
change 
Entrants previously FT <12 months ago 
-7.8% -17.6% 
6 Occupational wage 
change 
Entrants who were previously PT 
-11.2% -18.1% 
Those Employed FT 3 Months Ago 
7 Occupational wage 
change 
Previously in FT employment 
-2.0% -1.9% 
8 Occupational wage 
change 
Previously in FT employment with 
change in employer -8.9% -9.3% 
9 Occupational wage 
change 
Previously in FT employment with no 
change in employer -0.8% -0.9% 
Those Employed PT 3 Months Ago 
10 Occupational wage 
change 
Previously in PT employment 
-4.4% -5.5% 
11 Occupational wage 
change 
Previously in PT employment with 
change in employer -8.1% -11.0% 
12 Occupational wage 
change 
Previously in PT employment with no 
change in employer -2.1% -2.4% 
Those with no change in employer and no change in hours status 
13 Change in Occupation All Stayers -0.1% 0.0% 
14 Occupational wage 
change 
Stayers with change in occupation 
-1.2% -0.3% 
 
Notes:  
1. Data come from LFS for period June 2001 to February 2004.   
2. Changes are from one quarter to another.   
3. Other controls included are education, region, year, household characteristics, quartic 
in potential experience. 
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Table 6.4 
The Occupations of Women with Nursing and Teaching Qualifications 
 
 Teaching Qualification Nursing Qualification 
 FT  (%) PT (%) FT  (%) PT (%) 
Managers and senior officials 7.3 3.1 12.3 3.0 
Professional occupations  
(excl teaching professionals) 
2.2 1.6 4.6 3.7 
Teaching professionals 71.4 55.7 1.8 1.9 
Associate professional and 
technical (excl Health and Social 
Welfare Associate Professionals) 
4.1 5.7 1.9 2.2 
Health and Social Welfare 
Associate Professionals 
4.7 7.3 63.2 64.9 
Administrative and  secretarial 4.6 10.1 2.8 5.3 
Skilled trades 0.4 1.2 0.4 0.5 
Caring Personal service  3.4 9.4 11.1 13.8 
Leisure and Other Personal Service 0.7 1.1 0.3 0.4 
Sales and customer service   0.6 2.5 0.6 2.1 
Process, plant and machine 
operatives   
0.2 0.4 0.2 0.2 
Elementary 0.4 1.8 0.7 1.9 
 
Notes. 
1. Source of data is Labour Force Survey, 2001-2003. 
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Table 7.1 
The employment status of women in the EU  
 
Country 
Part-time  
employment 
as % of total 
employment 
Employment as 
% of 
Population 
 
Unemployment 
as % of the 
labour force 
 
Labour force 
participation 
rate 
     
U.K. 40 63 5 67 
Sweden 20 67 10 74 
Finland 11 78 15 92 
Denmark 18 84 10 93 
Germany 33 61 12 70 
Netherlands 53 50 20 63 
Belgium 28 57 18 70 
Luxembourg 26 52 3 54 
Austria 26 66 6 70 
Ireland 32 44 9 48 
France 18 61 14 71 
Italy 15 43 21 54 
Spain 21 34 28 47 
Portugal 10 64 12 72 
Greece 12 34 25 46 
     
Total 26 54 14 63 
 
Notes. 
1. Part-time employment is the % working part-time in total employment (part-time 
status is self-assessed).  
2. The employment rate is the ratio between total employment and the working age 
population. The unemployment rate is the ratio between unemployment and the labour 
force. The participation rate is the ratio between the labour force and the working age 
population. 
3. Source and sample: ECHPS, 1994-2001, females aged 15-64. 
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Table 7.2 
Part-Time Employment as a Percentage of Total Employment in the EU – by age 
 
 Age categories 
Country 15-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 Total 
       
U.K. 30 34 44 41 56 40 
Sweden 41 18 18 15 26 20 
Finland 32 10 8 7 16 11 
Denmark 22 11 14 22 29 18 
Germany 9 25 40 40 45 33 
Netherlands 27 39 66 63 68 53 
Belgium 22 23 32 31 34 28 
Luxembourg 9 18 32 39 35 26 
Austria 6 24 33 31 36 26 
Ireland 14 22 42 49 54 32 
France 20 16 18 19 26 18 
Italy 13 14 16 15 14 15 
Spain 22 21 20 21 29 21 
Portugal 6 6 9 16 33 10 
Greece 12 11 9 14 31 12 
       
Total 18 20 27 28 37 25 
 
Notes. 
1. All figures reported are % working part-time in the corresponding category. 
2. Part-time status is self-assessed. 
3. Source and sample: ECHPS, 1994-2001, female employees aged 15-64, 
excluding students. 
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Table 7.3 
Part-Time Employment as a Percentage of Total Employment in the EU – by education 
 
 Education levels 
country Low  Medium High  Total 
     
U.K. 48 38 31 40 
Sweden 32 22 13 20 
Finland 13 14 7 11 
Denmark 24 18 14 18 
Germany 38 33 27 33 
Netherlands 53 55 43 53 
Belgium 44 31 20 28 
Luxembourg 30 22 23 26 
Austria 28 25 22 26 
Ireland 50 27 17 32 
France 25 17 12 18 
Italy 17 13 17 15 
Spain 30 18 14 21 
Portugal 12 4 8 10 
Greece 16 8 12 12 
     
Total 32 25 19 26 
 
Notes. 
1. All figures reported are % working part-time in the corresponding category. 
2. Part-time status is self-assessed. 
3.  Low education: less than second stage of secondary education (ISCED 0-2); medium 
education: second stage of secondary education (ISCED 3); high education: 
recognized third level education (ISCED 5-7). 
4. Source and sample: ECHPS, 1994-2001, female employees aged 15-64, excluding 
students 
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Table 7.4 
Part-Time Employment as a Percentage of Total Employment in the EU 
 – by occupation 
 
 Occupation (from higher to lower) 
country A b c d e f g h i Total 
           
U.K. 14 27 29 36 60 27 20 22 69 40 
Finland 3 7 9 9 13 12 4 7 23 10 
Denmark 7 7 14 17 25 33 7 5 35 17 
Germany 10 27 25 33 39 22 16 20 67 33 
Netherlands 24 41 47 50 68 55 43 40 78 53 
Belgium 2 27 23 19 43 46 29 12 53 29 
Luxembourg 19 28 22 18 18 10 16 13 48 26 
Austria 7 17 16 22 28 56 19 16 46 25 
Ireland 12 22 19 25 43 96 23 13 61 32 
France 6 17 11 16 22 30 12 7 40 18 
Italy 8 17 12 11 18 35 8 9 25 15 
Spain 13 12 13 12 22 46 13 10 43 21 
Portugal 3 10 5 2 11 62 3 0 21 10 
Greece 8 18 6 5 10 70 7 1 19 12 
           
Total 12 21 21 22 34 49 10 12 45 26 
 
Notes. 
1. All figures reported are % working part-time in the corresponding category.  
2. Part-time status is self-assessed. 
3. Definition of occupations: 
a. Legislators, senior officials and managers 
b. Professionals 
c. Technicians and associate professionals 
d. Clerks 
e. Service workers and shop and market sales workers 
f. Skilled agricultural and fishery workers 
g. Craft and related trades workers 
h. Plant and machine operators and assemblers 
i. Elementary occupations 
4. Source and sample: ECHPS, 1994-2001, female employees aged 15-64, excluding 
students. Sweden is excluded as no information on occupations is available. 
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Table 7.5 
The occupational distribution of women by hours status in the EU  
 
 
Occupation (from higher to lower) 
 
 Among women working full-time 
country a b c d e f g h i Total 
           
U.K. 13 16 15 29 16 0 2 5 5 100 
Finland 5 24 21 17 20 1 4 2 7 100 
Denmark 3 16 27 22 20 0 2 4 7 100 
Germany 3 12 34 21 17 1 5 4 5 100 
Netherlands 7 20 27 22 14 1 2 3 4 100 
Belgium 3 25 15 33 11 0 2 2 9 100 
Luxembourg 2 11 20 28 19 1 2 2 14 100 
Austria 3 6 19 28 25 1 5 2 10 100 
Ireland 4 19 12 25 21 0 2 11 7 100 
France 4 8 24 30 18 1 2 6 8 100 
Italy 1 15 13 34 11 1 11 4 11 100 
Spain 1 22 14 19 20 0 5 3 16 100 
Portugal 1 10 10 17 19 2 17 7 17 100 
Greece 1 19 12 28 17 1 8 3 11 100 
           
Total 4 15 19 25 17 1 6 4 9 100 
                    
 Among women working part-time 
country a b c d e f g h i Total 
           
U.K. 3 9 9 24 36 0 1 2 16 100 
Finland 1 16 19 16 26 1 1 1 19 100 
Denmark 1 6 21 20 32 1 1 1 17 100 
Germany 1 9 24 21 22 1 2 2 19 100 
Netherlands 2 13 22 20 27 1 1 2 13 100 
Belgium 0 22 11 19 21 0 2 1 24 100 
Luxembourg 2 12 17 18 12 0 1 1 38 100 
Austria 1 4 11 24 29 2 4 1 24 100 
Ireland 1 12 6 17 34 2 1 4 23 100 
France 1 8 13 27 23 1 1 2 23 100 
Italy 0 18 10 25 14 2 6 2 22 100 
Spain 1 11 8 9 21 1 3 1 45 100 
Portugal 0 10 4 3 19 21 5 0 37 100 
Greece 1 33 6 12 14 11 5 0 19 100 
           
Total 1 11 14 20 26 2 2 2 21 100 
           
 
Notes. 
All figures reported are % of women in each occupation, by hours, status.  See also notes to 
Table 7.4 
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Table 7.6 
Part-Time Employment as a Percentage of Total Employment in the EU 
 – by household structure 
 
 Household structure 
Country 
Single, 
no 
children 
Married, 
no 
children 
Married, 
with 
children 
Single, 
with 
children 
Total 
 
      
U.K. 24 29 54 44 40 
Sweden 25 19 20 17 20 
Finland 15 12 9 7 11 
Denmark 19 20 17 9 18 
Germany 9 24 53 32 33 
Netherlands 22 34 81 58 53 
Belgium 12 21 35 29 28 
Luxembourg 7 16 48 20 26 
Austria 6 15 43 25 26 
Ireland 11 17 50 47 32 
France 12 19 21 12 18 
Italy 12 11 18 10 15 
Spain 18 19 25 23 21 
Portugal 6 12 12 16 10 
Greece 9 14 13 10 12 
      
Total 14 22 34 25 26 
 
Notes. 
1. All figures reported are % working part-time in the corresponding category. 
2. Part-time status is self-assessed.  
3. “Married” includes cohabiting; “children” refers to own children living in the 
household. 
4. Source and sample: ECHPS, 1994-2001, female employees aged 15-64, excluding 
students 
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Table 7.7 
Reasons for taking part-time jobs in the EU 
 
Notes. 
1. All figures reported are % of part-time workers in the corresponding category.  
Columns sum to 100. 
2. Part-time status is self-assessed. 
3. Source and sample: ECHPS, 1994-2001, female employees aged 15-64, excluding 
students (Students are defined as those still in FT education. This explains why some 
non-students report they are working PT because they are “in education or training”. 
Sweden is excluded as no information on the reason for holding a part-time job is 
available. 
 
Country  In education 
or training 
Disabled Caring after 
children or 
other family 
member 
Found no FT 
job 
Did not want 
FT job 
Other 
       
U.K. 3 2 36 7 19 34 
Finland 19 6 12 37 15 10 
Denmark 7 3 23 18 41 7 
Germany 2 2 84 5 6 2 
Netherlands 3 3 53 8 25 8 
Belgium 1 3 48 18 23 7 
Luxembourg 1 3 66 9 15 6 
Austria 2 1 69 9 11 7 
Ireland 2 1 49 17 23 8 
France 1 6 34 38 15 6 
Italy 4 1 30 24 15 26 
Spain 6 2 27 38 8 20 
Portugal 3 13 24 28 6 26 
Greece 3 2 16 44 14 21 
       
Total  4 3 45 18 18 13 
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Table 7.8 
Estimates of the PTPP in the EU: Different Methodologies 
 
 Dummy variable for part-time Oaxaca decomposition 
Country 
Raw log  
FT-PT  
pay gap 
Basic 
controls 
Basic 
controls  
+ occ 
Basic controls 
Av FT 
Woman 
Basic controls 
Av PT 
Woman 
Basic controls 
+occ 
Av FT 
Woman 
Basic controls 
+ occ  
Av PT 
Woman 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
U.K. -23.5% -16.9% -10.9% -15.9% -17.8% -10.5% -11.5% 
Finland -14.1% -3.1% -1.3% -6.2% -6.7% -4.4% -7.2% 
Denmark -8.6% -5.4% -2.3% -5.4% -7.2% -2.7% -5.7% 
Germany 3.1% 7.3% 8.7% 9.0% 6.8% 10.4% 7.6% 
Netherlands -3.0% -7.0% -3.5% -5.0% -7.6% -2.0% -4.2% 
Belgium -1.2% 3.8% 6.1% 3.7% 1.6% 5.5% 3.4% 
Austria 2.1% 2.7% 7.3% 2.3% 6.2% 5.7% 10.1% 
Ireland -17.1% -10.6% -6.7% -9.6% -3.4% -5.7% -2.8% 
France -12.4% -3.3% -0.8% -3.0% -2.4% -0.7% 0.7% 
Italy 14.1% 15.8% 15.6% 16.2% 12.2% 16.2% 11.2% 
Spain -16.0% 1.1% 4.9% 1.5% -5.7% 4.5% -3.2% 
Portugal -6.9% 2.4% 2.8% -5.7% -17.0% -6.1% -10.8% 
Greece 8.3% 5.1% 4.3% 5.4% 1.7% 4.5% 6.3% 
 
Notes. 
1. The figures in columns 1-3 are obtained from the coefficients on a part-time dummy 
in a regression where the dependent variable is the log of the gross hourly wage. The 
actual figures reported are computed by converting the estimated coefficients on the 
PT dummy into percentage points difference. 
2. The figures in columns 4-7 represent the percentage points explained by different 
coefficients in a Oaxaca decomposition of the full-time/part-time wage gap.  
3. The controls used are: year dummies, 2 education dummies, experience and its 
square, foreign born, married, number of dependent children, one dummy for public 
sector, 18 industry dummies, 19 occupation dummies.  
4. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
5. Source and sample: ECHPS, 1994-2001, female employees aged 15-64, excluding 
students. Sweden is excluded as no information on wages is available. Luxembourg is 
excluded due to small sample size. 
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Table 7.9 
The Importance of Characteristics in Explaining the PTPP in the EU 
 
Portion explained by all characteristics  
Country 
Raw log  
FT-PT  
pay gap 
Evaluated at 
own FT coeffs. 
Evaluated at 
U.K. FT coeffs.
Evaluated at 
own PT coeffs.  
Evaluated at 
U.K. PT coeffs.
      
U.K. -21.9% -14.3% -14.3% -13.9% -13.9% 
Finland -9.4% -12.0% -15.9% -10.8% -13.3% 
Denmark -9.0% -6.6% -13.6% -6.3% -13.3% 
Germany 2.2% -8.7% -7.4% -6.5% -6.8% 
Netherlands -8.8% -4.5% -10.1% -2.2% -8.5% 
Belgium -5.3% -9.4% -11.8% -6.3% -10.9% 
Austria 2.6% -5.0% -3.8% -6.9% -5.9% 
Ireland -22.7% -18.3% -15.0% -19.7% -15.1% 
France -10.1% -11.0% -12.7% -11.6% -11.9% 
Italy 13.0% -6.0% -9.2% -1.9% -11.0% 
Spain -14.8% -25.2% -20.1% -17.7% -22.0% 
Portugal -2.3% -22.8% -21.3% -21.5% -27.5% 
Greece 6.3% -7.6% -11.0% -8.0% -13.2% 
Portion explained by occupation alone 
Country 
Raw log  
FT-PT  
pay gap 
Evaluated at 
own FT coeffs. 
Evaluated at 
U.K. FT coeffs.
Evaluated at 
own PT coeffs.  
Evaluated at 
U.K. PT coeffs.
      
U.K. -21.9% -9.1% -9.1% -11.5% -11.5% 
Finland -9.4% -5.1% -6.6% -3.6% -8.3% 
Denmark -9.0% -4.8% -7.9% -5.4% -10.6% 
Germany 2.2% -5.8% -6.2% -5.8% -7.2% 
Netherlands -8.8% -6.7% -7.5% -6.6% -10.1% 
Belgium -5.3% -5.4% -5.7% -4.7% -8.6% 
Austria 2.6% -5.4% -6.0% -6.2% -8.1% 
Ireland -22.7% -13.2% -10.0% -10.8% -12.9% 
France -10.1% -6.6% -6.0% -6.3% -7.7% 
Italy 13.0% -1.3% -2.9% -0.8% -4.1% 
Spain -14.8% -11.0% -10.1% -9.2% -14.1% 
Portugal -2.3% -12.3% -10.4% -24.8% -18.5% 
Greece 6.3% 1.2% -2.8% 8.8% -5.2% 
 
Notes. 
1. The figures represent the total raw PTPP and the percentage-points explained by (i) 
all characteristics (upper panel) and (ii) occupation alone (lower panel) in a Oaxaca 
decomposition of the full-time/part-time wage gap.  
2. See Table 7.8 for controls used in the regressions. 
3. Source and sample: ECHPS, 1994-2001, female employees aged 15-64, excluding 
students. Sweden is excluded as no information on wages is available. Luxembourg is 
excluded due to small sample size. 
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Table 7.10 
Changes in hours, jobs and occupations in the EU 
 
 Currently Full-time Currently Part-time 
Country 
%  
changing 
hours status 
% 
 previously 
unemployed 
%  
previously 
inactive 
%  
changing 
hours status 
%  
previously 
unemployed 
%  
previously 
inactive 
       
U.K. 6.9 1.4 2.7 9.1 1.5 24.5 
Sweden 8.5 4.0 13.9 29.3 4.4 13.0 
Finland 3.3 4.0 1.7 25.2 11.0 7.0 
Denmark 3.6 3.3 1.2 15.7 5.7 4.5 
Germany 4.7 3.3 1.4 7.7 4.0 24.3 
Netherlands 8.4 2.3 1.3 7.4 7.1 22.0 
Belgium 4.3 2.0 1.0 11.2 7.3 11.5 
Luxembourg 3.8 0.9 3.9 9.1 1.6 18.7 
Austria 4.2 1.6 1.5 11.3 2.5 18.0 
Ireland 6.6 3.1 3.6 9.6 3.2 32.1 
France 3.3 2.5 2.3 11.2 5.8 7.4 
Italy 5.4 4.0 2.5 19.4 5.9 12.6 
Spain 4.6 8.0 3.7 11.2 13.4 26.5 
Portugal 2.1 3.8 2.1 12.4 6.0 32.7 
Greece 4.0 6.6 3.6 17.9 9.6 21.2 
       
Total 4.9 3.5 3.1 11.4 5.1 20.7 
 
Notes. 
1. Part-time status is self-assessed. 
2. Source and sample: ECHPS, 1994-2001, females aged 15-64, excluding students. 
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Table 7.11 
Changes in Employers and Occupations in the EU 
 
(a) Those Changing Hours Status 
(b) Among workers not changing hours status 
Notes. 
1. Part-time status is self-assessed. 
2. Source and sample: ECHPS, 1994-2001, females aged 15-64, excluding students. See top of each panel 
for subsample used in each case. 
 
 Currently full-time Currently part-time 
country 
% with new 
employer 
% moving 
to better 
paid 
occupation 
% moving 
to worse 
paid 
occupation 
% with new 
employer 
%  moving 
to better 
paid 
occupation 
%  moving 
to worse 
paid 
occupation 
       
U.K. 39.4 23.9 5.3 26.8 8.8 18.2 
Sweden 4.6 n.a. n.a. 8.3 n.a. n.a. 
Finland 29.0 19.6 4.7 15.0 6.1 9.9 
Denmark 35.1 19.5 6.2 30.7 7.9 13.2 
Germany 28.7 13.0 6.2 16.9 7.5 11.2 
Netherlands 30.8 24.0 9.0 18.0 13.9 15.3 
Belgium 17.3 12.7 12.6 11.7 12.1 8.5 
Luxembourg 11.6 20.0 6.6 15.3 8.8 14.2 
Austria 11.8 12.0 9.7 18.0 12.5 12.8 
Ireland 24.4 19.1 7.0 15.5 15.6 11.5 
France 13.3 4.2 3.9 9.6 0.9 4.7 
Italy 8.9 6.6 5.4 11.1 9.6 4.9 
Spain 38.8 17.3 11.6 20.6 11.1 9.3 
Portugal 26.2 13.3 10.2 16.3 12.1 10.4 
Greece 16.5 6.4 3.5 13.0 7.5 4.7 
       
Total 22.8 15.7 7.6 16.5 9.6 11.7 
 Currently full-time Currently part-time 
Country 
% with new 
employer 
% moving 
to better 
paid 
occupation 
% moving 
to worse 
paid 
occupation 
% with new 
employer 
%  moving 
to better 
paid 
occupation 
%  moving 
to worse 
paid 
occupation 
       
U.K. 19.1 7.8 7.0 19.6 6.6 5.1 
Sweden 6.5 n.a. n.a. 10.5 n.a. n.a. 
Finland 13.7 4.1 2.7 34.6 2.6 3.6 
Denmark 17.3 3.6 2.1 17.8 2.6 1.3 
Germany 14.9 4.6 4.1 13.8 5.2 5.1 
Netherlands 17.2 10.1 8.0 16.4 7.8 6.8 
Belgium 9.1 7.0 8.3 9.4 6.1 7.3 
Luxembourg 7.4 5.0 2.6 8.6 1.7 1.0 
Austria 9.2 7.0 7.0 14.1 6.4 6.1 
Ireland 19.6 10.7 6.8 32.5 9.8 6.4 
France 7.4 1.5 0.8 17.1 1.2 0.7 
Italy 10.3 5.3 3.7 14.5 6.6 3.5 
Spain 19.3 10.2 8.1 36.6 6.9 7.3 
Portugal 13.0 8.9 7.6 19.4 7.8 5.6 
Greece 13.4 3.4 2.9 23.3 3.0 1.7 
       
Total 13.5 6.2 5.0 18.3 6.0 5.1 
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Table 7.12 
 Under-utilisation of skills on part-time jobs in the EU 
 
Country 
 
% of FT women who 
are 
overeducated 
 
% of PT women who 
are 
overeducated 
 
Adjusted Differential FT-
PT 
    
U.K. 66 63 +2.6 
Finland 60 66 +18.0*** 
Denmark 58 53 -9.8** 
Germany 60 62 +4.6 
Netherlands 41 40 +5.4** 
Belgium 60 56 -2.4 
Austria 57 64 +5.3 
Ireland 52 57 +24.9*** 
France 46 45 +3.8 
Italy 48 51 +4.2 
Spain 60 64 +12.7*** 
Portugal 46 42 -8.9** 
Greece 60 70 +29.6*** 
 
Notes. 
1. Figures reported in columns 1 and 2 are the % of women who feel overqualified, by 
hours status. Figures reported in column 3 are coefficients on a part-time dummy in a 
probit model for whether a worker feels overqualified. 
2. Part-time status is self-assessed. 
3. The estimated equations also include: year dummies, 2 education dummies, age and 
its square, foreign born, married, number of dependent children, one dummy for 
public sector, 18 industry dummies, 19 occupation dummies. 
4. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
5. Source and sample: ECHPS, 1994-2001, female employees aged 15-64, excluding 
students. Sweden is excluded as no information on job satisfaction is available. 
Luxembourg is excluded due to small sample size. 
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 Table 7.13 
Average levels of subjective job satisfaction by hours status in the EU 
 
 Aspects of job satisfaction 
Country 
Overall Job security Earnings Working 
hours 
Type of 
work 
Working 
times 
Working 
conditions 
 
 
Among women working full-time 
        
U.K. 4.39 4.39 4.10 4.19 4.49 4.62 4.50 
Finland 4.59 4.59 3.96 4.56 4.50 4.81 4.52 
Denmark 4.92 4.92 4.20 4.80 4.85 4.97 4.74 
Germany 4.44 4.44 3.66 4.26 4.55 4.62 4.46 
Netherlands 4.70 4.70 4.35 4.60 4.83 4.85 4.32 
Belgium 4.51 4.51 3.99 4.48 4.66 4.73 4.43 
Luxembourg 4.82 4.82 4.38 4.78 4.87 4.83 4.70 
Austria 4.98 4.98 4.28 4.97 5.11 5.06 5.05 
Ireland 4.65 4.65 4.00 4.81 4.86 4.99 4.84 
France 4.44 4.44 3.67 3.33 4.60 4.36 4.26 
Italy 4.05 4.05 3.30 4.08 4.23 4.14 4.11 
Spain 4.28 4.28 3.32 4.04 4.34 4.25 4.27 
Portugal 3.96 3.96 3.13 3.94 4.17 4.10 4.19 
Greece 3.97 4.10 3.30 4.09 4.15 4.13 4.20 
        
Total 4.39 4.39 3.70 4.21 4.51 4.49 4.39 
 
 
Among women working part-time 
        
U.K. 4.70 4.44 4.24 4.78 4.57 4.81 4.68 
Finland 4.45 4.31 3.72 4.33 4.43 4.66 4.56 
Denmark 4.96 4.75 4.45 5.22 4.92 5.03 4.80 
Germany 4.36 4.49 3.68 4.67 4.48 4.82 4.55 
Netherlands 4.73 4.68 4.33 4.91 4.81 5.00 4.40 
Belgium 4.50 4.53 4.04 4.90 4.70 4.78 4.62 
Luxembourg 4.68 4.92 4.21 5.00 4.78 4.94 5.01 
Austria 4.92 4.84 4.30 5.17 5.03 5.23 5.24 
Ireland 4.54 4.25 3.93 4.94 4.74 5.15 5.07 
France 4.32 4.02 3.48 3.38 4.50 4.48 4.38 
Italy 3.76 3.89 3.01 4.32 4.12 4.39 4.30 
Spain 3.78 3.75 2.99 3.99 4.02 4.46 4.51 
Portugal 3.33 3.72 2.71 3.63 3.82 4.10 4.17 
Greece 3.15 3.31 2.58 4.06 3.92 4.27 4.11 
        
Total 4.43 4.35 3.84 4.59 4.56 4.78 4.58 
 
Notes. 
1. Figures reported are average subjective job satisfactions levels by hours status.  
2. Job satisfaction is measured on a scale 1-5, from “very dissatisfied” to “very satisfied”. 
3. Part-time status is self-assessed. 
4. Source and sample: ECHPS, 1994-2001, female employees aged 15-64, excluding 
students. Sweden is excluded as no information on job satisfaction is available. 
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Table 7.14 
The effect of holding a part-time job on several aspect of job-satisfaction in the EU 
 
(a) Results based on the whole sample 
 
 Aspects of job satisfaction 
Country 
Overall Job security Earnings Working 
hours 
Type of 
work 
Working 
times 
Working 
conditions 
        
U.K. 0.136*** 0.399*** 0.005 0.115*** -0.025 0.233*** 0.090** 
Finland -0.100** -0.209*** -0.103** -0.137*** -0.096** -0.078* -0.054 
Denmark 0.079** 0.400*** -0.107*** 0.204*** 0.062* 0.118*** 0.070** 
Germany 0.059 0.388*** 0.202*** 0.081** -0.050 0.249*** 0.072* 
Netherlands 0.059*** 0.270*** -0.129*** 0.052** -0.115*** 0.151*** 0.017 
Belgium 0.070** 0.374*** 0.003 0.081** 0.045 0.158*** 0.187*** 
Austria 0.006 0.245*** -0.145*** 0.025 -0.020 0.214*** 0.186*** 
Ireland -0.128*** 0.112*** -0.417*** -0.087*** -0.151*** 0.067** 0.078** 
France -0.100*** 0.168*** -0.265*** -0.105*** -0.040* 0.166*** 0.123*** 
Italy -0.091*** 0.294*** -0.121*** -0.188*** -0.022 0.297*** 0.139*** 
Spain -0.120*** 0.093*** -0.240*** -0.117*** -0.083*** 0.237*** 0.130*** 
Portugal -0.442*** -0.453*** -0.430*** -0.496*** -0.350*** -0.039 -0.017 
Greece -0.506*** -0.100** -0.520*** -0.619*** -0.234*** -0.014 -0.135*** 
 
(b) Excluding “involuntary” part-timers 
 
 Aspects of job satisfaction 
Country 
Overall Job security Earnings Working 
hours 
Type of 
work 
Working 
times 
Working 
conditions 
        
U.K. 0.140*** 0.014 0.133*** 0.430*** -0.025 0.275*** 0.093** 
Finland 0.024 0.120** 0.032 0.245*** -0.063 0.042 0.037 
Denmark 0.129*** -0.001 0.237*** 0.654*** 0.064* 0.213*** 0.086** 
Germany 0.091** 0.272*** 0.139*** 0.544*** -0.052 0.280*** 0.084** 
Netherlands 0.084*** -0.087*** 0.091*** 0.384*** -0.124*** 0.166*** 0.011 
Belgium 0.172*** 0.089** 0.192*** 0.641*** 0.101*** 0.222*** 0.227*** 
Austria 0.072** -0.098*** 0.102*** 0.374*** -0.004 0.240*** 0.197*** 
Ireland -0.072** -0.276*** -0.015 0.365*** -0.129*** 0.129*** 0.090** 
France 0.039 -0.008 0.049* 0.481*** 0.083*** 0.310*** 0.140*** 
Italy 0.045 0.033 -0.04 0.514*** 0.080*** 0.437*** 0.207*** 
Spain -0.006 -0.077** 0.050 0.372*** -0.011 0.366*** 0.168*** 
Portugal -0.341*** -0.263*** -0.314*** -0.085* -0.329*** 0.049 -0.028 
Greece -0.159** -0.143** -0.338*** 0.208*** -0.003 0.137** -0.071 
 
Notes. 
1. Figures reported are coefficients on a part-time dummy in an ordered probit model for subjective levels of job 
satisfaction.  
2. Job satisfaction is measured on a scale 1-5, from “very dissatisfied” to “very satisfied”. 
3. Part-time status is self-assessed. 
4. The estimated equations also include: year dummies, 2 education dummies, age and its square, foreign born, 
married, number of dependent children, one dummy for public sector, 18 industry dummies, 19 occupation 
dummies. 
5. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
6. Source and sample: ECHPS, 1994-2001, female employees aged 15-64, excluding students. Sweden is 
excluded as no information on job satisfaction is available. Luxembourg is excluded due to small sample size. 
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Table 8.1 
The Impact of PT Working on the Receipt of Training 
 
 Incidence among 
FT Women 
Unadjusted 
PT-FT 
Differential
Adjusted 
PT-FT 
Differential  
Adjusted 
PT-FT 
Differential
Controls - None Basic Basic + 
broad 
occupation 
-1.9% -1.5% Job Related Education or 
Training in Last Week 
9% -2.8% 
   
-5.5% -3.9% -2.8% Job Related Education or 
Training in Last 4 Weeks 
18% 
   
-10.0% -7.1% -5.1% Job Related Education or 
Training in Last 13 Weeks 
35% 
   
-0.061 -0.011 -0.004 Total Hours of Training in 
Past Week 
0.22hours 
   
 
Notes. 
1.  The source of the data is LFS 2001 to 2003.  The other controls included are 
education, region, year, household characteristics, a quartic in potential experience, 
and industry. 
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Table A1 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable All Working 
Women 
FT Working 
Women 
PT Working 
Women 
Part-Time Working 41% 0% 100% 
Graduates 30% 36% 22% 
GCSE or equivalent 34% 31% 39% 
No qualifications 18% 14% 23% 
Age 16-19 3% 3% 2% 
Age 20-24 8% 11% 4% 
Age 25-29 10% 13% 6% 
Age 30-34 13% 13% 12% 
Age 40-44 14% 13% 16% 
Age 45-49 13% 13% 13% 
Age 50-54 11% 11% 12% 
Age 55-59 10% 8% 12% 
Age 60-64 3% 2% 6% 
Married without Children 47% 54% 36% 
Married with Children 32% 21% 46% 
Single with Children 10% 8% 12% 
Average Age of Youngest Child 7.8yrs 8.5yrs 7.2yrs 
Number of Children 70% 46% 104% 
Black 2% 2% 1% 
Asian 3% 3% 2% 
Tyne & Wear 2% 2% 3% 
Rest of Northern Region 3% 3% 2% 
South Yorkshire 2% 2% 4% 
West Yorkshire 4% 4% 3% 
Rest of Yorks & Humberside 3% 3% 7% 
East Midlands 7% 7% 4% 
East Anglia 4% 4% 5% 
Inner London 3% 4% 2% 
Outer London 6% 7% 5% 
South West 9% 8% 9% 
West Midlands (met county) 4% 4% 4% 
Rest of West Midlands 5% 5% 5% 
Greater Manchester 4% 4% 3% 
Merseyside 2% 2% 2% 
Rest of North-West 4% 4% 4% 
Wales 5% 5% 5% 
Strathclyde 4% 4% 3% 
Rest of Scotland 6% 6% 6% 
Northern Ireland 4% 4% 3% 
Job Tenure < 5 years 51% 51% 51% 
Job Tenure 10-15 years 12% 12% 12% 
Job Tenure 15+ years 16% 17% 16% 
Public Sector 38% 37% 38% 
Non-permanent Job 6% 4% 8% 
Establishment with >25 Employees 64% 70% 55% 
Agriculture & fishing 0% 0% 0% 
Energy & water 0% 1% 0% 
Manufacturing 8% 11% 5% 
Construction 2% 2% 1% 
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Transport & Communication 4% 4% 3% 
Banking, finance & insurance etc 14% 17% 11% 
Public admin, education & health 45% 44% 47% 
Other services 5% 5% 6% 
Managers and senior officials 10% 14% 4% 
Professional occupations 11% 14% 7% 
Associate professional and technical 14% 17% 11% 
Skilled trades occupations 2% 2% 2% 
Personal service occupations 14% 12% 17% 
Sales and customer service 
occupations 
11% 7% 17% 
Process, plant and machine 
operatives 
3% 3% 2% 
Elementary occupations 11% 5% 18% 
 
Notes:  
1. Sample is LFS March 2003 – February 2004.  Basic sample is women aged 16-64 
who are not in full-time education.  
2. Total sample size is 95314. 
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Table A2 
The Determinants of the Probability of Working Part-Time 
Variable Marginal 
Effect 
(s.e.) 
Variable Marginal 
Effect 
(s.e.) 
Variable Marginal 
Effect 
(s.e.) 
Graduates 0.003 Tyne & Wear -0.072 Job Tenure < 5 years 0 
 [0.006]  [0.012]**  [0.005] 
GCSE or equivalent 0.026 Rest of Northern -0.051 Job Tenure 10-15 years -0.023 
 [0.005]** Region [0.010]**  [0.006]** 
No qualifications 0.008 South Yorkshire -0.016 Job Tenure 15+ years -0.053 
 [0.006]  [0.012]  [0.006]** 
Age 16-19 -0.172 West Yorkshire -0.031 Public Sector 0.009 
 [0.009]**  [0.009]**  [0.005] 
Age 20-24 -0.178 Rest of Yorks 0.01 Non-permanent Job 0.221 
 [0.007]** & Humberside [0.011]  [0.008]** 
Age 25-29 -0.146 East Midlands -0.019 Establishment with >25 -0.132 
 [0.007]**  [0.008]* Employees [0.004]** 
Age 30-34 -0.065 East Anglia -0.003 Agriculture & fishing -0.074 
 [0.007]**  [0.010]  [0.028]** 
Age 40-44 0.04 Inner London -0.122 Energy & water -0.216 
 [0.007]**  [0.010]**  [0.019]** 
Age 45-49 0.126 Outer London -0.064 Manufacturing -0.173 
 [0.007]**  [0.008]**  [0.007]** 
Age 50-54 0.211 South West 0.004 Construction -0.08 
 [0.008]**  [0.007]  [0.013]** 
Age 55-59 0.304 West Midlands -0.049 Transport & -0.125 
 [0.008]** (met county) [0.009]** Communication [0.009]** 
Age 60-64 0.451 Rest of -0.024 Banking, finance -0.09 
 [0.008]** West Midlands [0.009]** & insurance etc [0.006]** 
Married without 0.051 Greater -0.079 Public admin, 0.005 
Children [0.007]** Manchester [0.009]** education & health [0.007] 
Married with 0.555 Merseyside -0.053 Other services -0.015 
Children [0.009]**  [0.012]**  [0.009] 
Single with 0.481 Rest of North -0.045 Managers and senior officials -0.278 
Children [0.009]** West [0.009]**  [0.005]** 
Age of Youngest -0.026 Wales -0.064 Professional occupations -0.189 
Child [0.001]**  [0.008]**  [0.006]** 
Number of 0.047 Strathclyde -0.088 Associate professional and 
technical 
-0.101 
Children [0.004]**  [0.009]**  [0.006]** 
Black -0.161 Rest of -0.045 Skilled trades occupations -0.021 
 [0.011]** Scotland [0.008]**  [0.013] 
Asian -0.1 Northern -0.127 Personal service occupations 0.026 
 [0.010]** Ireland [0.009]**  [0.006]** 
    Sales and customer 0.233 
    service occupations [0.007]** 
    Process, plant -0.023 
    and machine operatives [0.012] 
    Elementary occupations 0.289 
     [0.007]** 
Notes:  
1. Sample is LFS March 2003 – February 2004.  Total sample size is 95314. 
2. Estimated model is probit with dependent variable whether individual works PT.   
3.  Reported coefficients are marginal effects and all variables are dummy variables except number of 
children and age of youngest child (* denotes significance at 5% level, ** at 1% level).   
4.  Reference category is a white woman, aged 35-39 with ‘A’ levels who is isngle without children, who 
lives in the South-East, has job tenure between 5 and 10 years, is in the private sector in a permanent job in a 
workplace with less than 25 workers in retail and distribution and working in administration.
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Table B1 
Estimates of the PT Pay Penalty: Different Methodologies 
 
  Basic 
Controls 
Basic 
Controls+ 
broad 
occupation 
Basic 
Controls+ 
narrow 
occupation 
     
Unadjusted PTPP -0.250 -0.250 -0.250 
     
Adjusted PTPP (Constant) -0.116 -0.034 -0.025 
Oaxaca Decompostions 
Adjusted PTPP (Varying) 
Average FT Woman 
-0.114 -0.032 -0.024 
     
Adjusted PTPP (Varying) 
Average PT Woman 
-0.117 -0.035 -0.030 
Reweighting Estimates 
Adjusted PTPP (Varying) 
Average FT Woman 
-0.069 0.000 0.011 
    
Adjusted PTPP (Varying) 
Average PT Woman 
-0.137 -0.044 -0.047 
 
Notes. 
1. These estimates are more extensive versions of those to be found in Table 4.1 in the 
main text.  Figures here are log points that are corrected to percentage points in Table 
4.1.  Data and controls are described in the notes to that Table. 
2. Methodology is described in Appendix B. 
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Table B2 
Estimates of the PT penalty in the ECHPS: Different Methodologies 
 
 Dummy variable for part-time Oaxaca decomposition 
Country 
Raw log  
FT-PT  
Pay gap 
Basic 
controls 
Basic 
controls  
+ occ 
Basic 
controls  
Av FT 
Woman 
Basic 
controls   
Av PT 
Woman 
Basic 
controls 
+occ 
Av FT 
Woman 
Basic controls + 
occ  
Av PT Woman 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
U.K. -0.268*** -0.185*** -0.115*** -0.173*** -0.196*** -0.111*** -0.122*** 
Finland -0.152*** -0.031** -0.013 -0.064*** -0.069*** -0.045*** -0.075*** 
Denmark -0.090*** -0.056*** -0.023*** -0.056*** -0.075*** -0.027*** -0.059*** 
Germany 0.031*** 0.070*** 0.083*** 0.086*** 0.066*** 0.099*** 0.073*** 
Netherlands -0.030*** -0.073*** -0.036*** -0.051*** -0.079*** -0.020*** -0.043*** 
Belgium -0.012 0.037*** 0.059*** 0.036*** 0.016 0.054*** 0.033*** 
Austria 0.021 0.027** 0.070*** 0.023** 0.060*** 0.055*** 0.096*** 
Ireland -0.188*** -0.112*** -0.069*** -0.101*** -0.035*** -0.059*** -0.028*** 
France -0.132*** -0.034*** -0.008 -0.030*** -0.024** -0.007 0.007 
Italy 0.132*** 0.147*** 0.145*** 0.150*** 0.115*** 0.150*** 0.106*** 
Spain -0.174*** 0.011 0.048*** 0.015 -0.059*** 0.044*** -0.033*** 
Portugal -0.072*** 0.024 0.028** -0.059*** -0.186*** -0.063*** -0.114*** 
Greece 0.080*** 0.050*** 0.042*** 0.053*** 0.017 0.044*** 0.061*** 
 
Notes. 
1. The figures in columns 1-3 are the coefficients on a dummy for whether the individual 
is part-time in a regression where the dependent variable is the log of the gross hourly 
wage. 
2. The figures in columns 4-7 represent the log points explained by different coefficients 
in a Oaxaca decomposition of the full-time/part-time wage gap.  
3. The controls used are: year dummies, 2 education dummies, experience and its 
square, foreign born, married, number of dependent children, one dummy for public 
sector, 18 industry dummies, 19 occupation dummies.  
4. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
Source and sample: ECHPS, 1994-2001, female employees aged 15-64. Sweden is excluded 
as no information on wages is available. Luxembourg is excluded due to small sample size. 
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Table B3 
Fixed-Effects Estimates of the PTPP in the LFS 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Log Wage 
Measure 
Hourly 
Pay 
Hourly 
Pay 
Hourly 
Pay 
Hourly 
Pay 
Hourly 
Rate 
Hourly 
Rate 
Sample 2 obs on 
hourly 
pay 
2 obs on 
hourly 
pay 
2 obs on 
hourly 
pay & 
rate 
2 obs on 
hourly 
pay & 
rate 
2 obs on 
hourly 
pay 
& rate 
2 obs on 
hourly 
pay & 
rate 
Estimation 
Method 
OLS Fixed 
Effects 
OLS Fixed 
Effects 
OLS Fixed 
Effects 
Coefficient 
on PT 
Dummy 
-0.048 
(0.004) 
0.052 
(0.009) 
0.002 
(0.006 
0.079 
(0.012) 
-0.031 
(0.004) 
-0.019 
(0.007) 
Number of 
Observations 
41465 41465 14168 14168 14168 14168 
Notes. 
1. Sample is from LFS for March 2001 to November 2003 
2. Other controls included are those reported in Table 4.1 including occupation. 
3. Hourly pay is the derived hourly wage measure used in the main body of the text.  Hourly rate is the 
straight hourly rate. 
 
 
Table B4 
Fixed-Effects Estimates of the PTPP in the ECHPS 
 Dummy variable for part-time 
Country 
Raw log 
FT-PT  
Pay gap 
Basic 
controls 
Basic 
controls  
+ occ 
 1 2 3 
U.K. -0.005 0.003 0.015** 
Finland 0.054*** 0.068*** 0.068*** 
Denmark 0.019 0.033*** 0.040*** 
Germany 0.132*** 0.136*** 0.138*** 
Netherlands 0.100*** 0.055*** 0.059*** 
Belgium 0.165*** 0.148*** 0.149*** 
Austria 0.182*** 0.171*** 0.173*** 
Ireland 0.016 0.040*** 0.042*** 
France 0.242*** 0.265*** 0.265*** 
Italy 0.077*** 0.134*** 0.135*** 
Spain 0.127*** 0.173*** 0.172*** 
Portugal 0.107*** 0.165*** 0.163*** 
Greece 0.013 0.137*** 0.136*** 
Notes. 
1. The figures reported are the coefficients on a dummy for whether the individual is part-time in a 
regression where the dependent variable is the log of the gross hourly wage.  
2. The controls used are: year dummies, 2 education dummies, experience and its square, foreign born, 
married, number of dependent children, one dummy for public sector, 18 industry dummies, 19 
occupation dummies.  
3. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
Source and sample: ECHPS, 1994-2001, female employees aged 15-64. Sweden is excluded as no information 
on wages is available. Luxembourg is excluded due to small sample size. 
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Table B5 
Sample Selection Correction Estimates of the UK part-time pay penalty 
 
 Basic Controls Basic Controls 
+ broad 
occupation 
Unadjusted PTPP -0.251 -0.251 
Adjusted PTPP  
(Av FT Woman) 
-0.020 -0.106 
Adjusted PTPP  
(Av PT Woman) 
-0.051 -0.145 
Contribution of Sample 
Selection Correction 
-0.001 0.008 
Number of Observations 85191 85191 
 
Notes. 
1. Data is from LFS and as reported in the notes to Table 4.1 
2.  Basic Controls are as reported in Table 4.1 with the exclusion of marital status and 
child variables.  
3. The sample selection equation also includes marital status and children. 
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Figure 1.1 
The Part-time Pay Penalty 
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Notes. 
1. The measure of pay used is hourly earnings. 
2. Definition of PT status for LFS is self-assessed and the sample excludes students.  For 
NES the definition of PT status is basic usual hours<=30 with 25-hour cut-off for teachers. 
 
Figure 2.1 
Comparison of the Two Definitions – Analysis by Hours 
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Notes. 
1. Data source is LFS March 2003 to February 2004. 
2. Data refer to main jobs only. 
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Figure 3.1 
The Lifecycle Profile of Part-time Working 
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Notes. 
1. Source data is Labour Force Survey, March 2003-February 2004. 
2. Base is all women aged 16-54 who are working and not in full-time education. 
 
Figure 3.2 
The Lifecycle Profile of Part-time Working by Household Structure 
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Notes. 
1. Source data is Labour Force Survey, March 2003-February 2004 
2. Base is all women aged 16-54 who are working and not in full-time education. 
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Figure 3.3 
The Effect of Age of Youngest Child on Probability of Working Part-time 
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Notes. 
1. Source data is Labour Force Survey, March 2003-February 2004. 
2. Base is all women aged 16-54 who are working and not in full-time education. 
 
Figure 5.1 
The Proportion of Women Working Part-time 
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Notes. 
1. Source of data is spring quarters of LFS. 
2. Sample is working women aged between 16 and 64 inclusive who are not in full-time education. 
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Figure 5.2 
The Evolution of the Employment of PT and FT Women 
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Notes. 
1. Source of data is spring quarters of LFS. 
2. Sample is women aged between 16 and 64 inclusive who are not in full-time education. 
 
Figure 5.3 
The Evolution of the PT Pay Penalty, 1975-2001 
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Notes. 
1. Data is from NES.  Controls are dummy variables for each age, 2-digit occupation and 
2-digit industry.  Separate regressions are estimated for each year. 
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Figure 5.4 
The Relative Importance of Age, Industry and Occupation in Accounting 
for the PT Pay Penalty 
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Notes. 
1. Data is from NES.  Controls are dummy variables for each age, 2-digit occupation and 2-digit industry.  
Separate regressions are estimated for each year. 
 
Figure 5.5 
The Role of Rising Wage Inequality 
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Notes. 
1. Data is from NES.  Controls are dummy variables for each age, 2-digit occupation and 2-digit industry.  
Separate regressions are estimated for each year. 
2. The coefficients used are those estimated for full-time workers. 
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Figure 6.1 
The Percentage of Managers by Basic Weekly Hours 
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Notes. 
1. Source is LFS March 2003 to February 2004.   
2. Base is all women aged 16-54 who are working and not in full-time education. 
 
Figure 8.1 
The Impact of the National Minimum Wage for FT and PT Women 
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Notes. 
1. Source of data is New Earnings Survey for 1998 and 2000.  Sample is restricted to those aged 22 to 64 
who are eligible for the adult minimum wage. 
2. Figure shows the percentage increase in earnings at each percentile of the FT and PT women’s 
distribution of hourly wages.  
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Figure 8.2 
Average Days of Paid Holiday, 1992-2003 
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Notes. 
1. Source of data is Autumn quarters of the Labour Force Survey 
2. Base is all women aged 16-54 who are working and not in full-time education. 
 
Figure 8.3 
Percentage of Workers with no Paid Holiday, 1992-2003 
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Notes. 
1. Source of data is Autumn quarters of the Labour Force Survey 
2. Base is all women aged 16-54 who are working and not in full-time education. 
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Figure 8.4 
Recent Changes in the Fraction of Women Working Part-time 
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Notes: 
1. Source of Data is LFS 2000q1 to 2003q4. 
2. The vertical line represents the introduction of the Right to Request Flexible Working in April 2003. 
 
Figure 8.5 
Recent Changes in the Fraction of Women Wanting More and Fewer Hours 
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Notes: 
1. Source of Data is LFS 2000q1 to 2003q4. 
2. The vertical line represents the introduction of the Right to Request Flexible Working in April 
2003. 
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Figure 8.6 
Recent Changes in Fraction of Women Who have approached Employer about 
Working Fewer Hours and Fraction where Employer has Agreed 
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Notes: 
1. Source of Data is LFS 2000q1 to 2003q4. 
2. The vertical line represents the introduction of the Right to Request Flexible Working in April 2003. 
3. The variable ‘Approach’ is the percentage of women who have approached their employer about 
working fewer hours. The variable ‘Able’ is the percentage of women whose employers have been able 
to let them work shorter hours. 
4. Both questions are only asked of those women who would prefer to work shorter hours and this forms 
the sample for these questions. 
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Figure 8.7 
Recent Changes in the Incidence of Other Forms of Flexible Working 
 
a. Flex-Time and Term-Time Working 
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b. Job-Sharing and Annual Hours 
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Notes: 
1. Source of Data is LFS 2000q1 to 2003q4. 
2. The vertical line represents the introduction of the Right to Request Flexible Working 
in April 2003. 
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